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ARTICLES
PRIVACY, THE PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEE,
AND EMPLOYMENT TESTING: THE NEED
TO RESTRICT POLYGRAPH AND
PERSONALITY TESTING
Donald H. J. Hermann III*
"The secret things belong unto the Lord."
Deuteronomy 4:26
Prospective employees in both the public and private sectors in-
creasingly are finding that employment is conditioned upon their
submission to polygraph and psychological testing. A midwestern case
is reported in which a brewery made a lie detector test a condition for
employment, defending its use of the lie detector as a means of dn-
suring that alcoholics did not succeed in gaining employment at the
brewery.' A New York based retail chain is reported to have em-
ployed two teams of roving polygraph operators who staged surprise
visits to stores, lining up employees and questioning them about pil-
ferage.2 More recently, FBI agents are reported to have utilized lie
detectors on State Department officials in efforts to locate the sources
of news leaks.3
Surveying the prehiring use of the polygraph by federal government
agencies, Congressman John E. Moss found that nineteen agencies
used polygraphs to administer 20,000 tests during 1963. 4 Truth Veri-
fication, Inc., a Dallas firm specializing in the administration of poly-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky A.B., 1965, Stanford Univer-
sity; J.D., 1968, Columbia University.
1. Bradley, Union Unhappy over Employment Condition, Cervis Journal (Denver,
Colorado), August 16, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
2. Grimes, Use of Polygraph Tests by Employers Draws Mounting Labor Fire,
The Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1965, at 1, col. 1. [hereinafter cited as Grimes].
3. N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1971, at 1, col. I.
4. Hearings on Use of Polygraphs as "Lie Detectors" by the Federal Government
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., and 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964-65) [hereinafter cited as House Polygraph
Hearings].
Washington Law Review
graph tests, reported that it ran 42,000 tests in 1964, nearly all for
private companies. 5
No less prevalent during hiring procedures is the use of psycholog-
ical testing. The Department of Defense reported that in a single year
it administered 185,000 psychological tests to civilian personnel. 6 A
1964 National Industrial Conference Board survey of 473 businesses
indicated that eighty percent of the firms used psychological tests.7 Of
208 companies replying to another survey, 97 (46.4 percent) replied
that they were employing personality tests, a special category of psy-
chological tests.8
The Report of the Committee on the Judiciary on a bill "protecting
privacy and the rights of federal employees," which was passed by the
Senate in 1967, cited instances in which the polygraph interrogation
required of prospective government employees included some ex-
tremely personal and very irrelevant questions.!'
Among those psychological tests used for personality assessment is
the Minnesota Multaphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI); it and
similar tests have seen considerable use in industry and have been uti-
lized for managerial selection purposes.10 The questions, to be an-
swered by the, applicant "whether it is true as applied to you or false
as applied to you," describe a state of mind or a feeling about oneself
or others and include questions concerning physical conditions and
5. Grimes, supra note 2, at 1. Mr. Lindberg, Associate Director of John E. Reid &
Associates, another polygraphing firm, stated that every big company uses lie detectors
at least occasionally. Specifically, he named American Airlines, American Photocopy
Equipment Company, Armour & Co., Household Finance Corp., and Amphenol-Borg
Electronics. Reid & Associates reported that it conducted 5,200 polygraph tests for in-
dustry in 1964. Id.
6. Hearings on Psychological Testing Procedures and the Rights of Federal Em-
plovees Before the Subcomnmn. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., at 186(1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Senate Hearings].
7. Hobbe, Trends in Emplovee Testing, 1965 CONF. BD. RECORD 46-47.
8. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 136 (1967) [hereinafter cited as WESTIN].
The author defines personality tests as
1o] ral or written tests that go beyond measurement of intelligence, skills, or atti-
tudes and seek to measure emotional states, traits of character, sociopolitical
beliefs or values, sexual adjustment, and general propensities, and to use these
measurements to predict future performance.
id.
9. S. REP. No. 534, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 20-21 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 S.
REPORT].
10. J. MINER, PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 168 (1969).
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bodily functions, religious beliefs, and attitudes toward sex and sexual
behavior. 1
Criticism of personality and polygraph testing has taken three
forms: challenges to the reliability and validity of such testing; con-
cern about the dissemination and availability of testing data; and fear
of the loss of personal liberties through invasion of privacy, imposi-
tion of psychological inhibitions, and compulsion toward conformity.
The question of dissemination of personnel data and the growth of
personal dossiers has been dealt with extensively elsewhere, and is
generally beyond the scope of this article.' 2 This article will consider
legal challenges to the reliability and validity of such testing.' 3 The
scientific criticism of polygraph and personality testing has been ex-
tensive, and citation will be made to appropriate reviews of this litera-
ture.' 4 A more extensive discussion will consider present restraints
imposed by the courts and arbitrators of the use of testing in the em-
ployment context and will indicate likely further extensions of existing
11. S. HATHAWAY & J. McKINLEY, MINNESOTA MULTAPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY
(1943) [hereinafter cited as M.M.P.I.]. Examples of questions involving attitudes
toward bodily functions, religion and sex include: No. 542, "I have never had any black,
tarry-looking bowel movements;" No. 490, "I read the Bible several times a week;" No.
297, "I wish I were not bothered by thoughts about sex." See generally W. DAHLSTROM
& G. WELSH, M.M.P.I. HANDBOOK (1960).
12. See A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971). Although Miller is highly crit-
ical of psychological testing, especially personality testing, he does not favor outright
prohibition. He argues that when the safety or well-being of others depends upon the
stability and judgment of an employee, it is appropriate to use validated psychological
tests to determine his emotional stability. Nevertheless, Miller cautions that once this
concession to testing is made, and no matter how precise a standard is formulated, those
requiring testing may apply the standard in a conclusory fashion and thus justify their
testing practices. Id. at 98.
Miller goes on to formulate guidelines to limit the dangers created by the collecting
and storing of test results: procedures should be instituted to insure accuracy of test
data; access to test results should be restricted to highly trained professional personnel;
test material should be destroyed upon evaluation except where some paramount objec-
tive outweighs the risk to the individual's privacy; accuracy of test results should be reap-
praised periodically; test evaluations should not be used beyond the specific purpose for
which the test was administered; computerization of sensitive data should not be under-
taken in the absence of clear need; and computer data, where stored, should be pro-
tected by security devices, especially where a remote-access system is utilized. Id. at
104-05. See generally S. WHEELER, ON RECORD (1969).
13. Reliability and validity are words of art when used in the testing context. Relia-
bility refers to stability or consistency. Test reliability is the consistency of scores ob-
tained by the same person when retested with the identical test or with an equivalent
form of the test. In the context of polygraphy, reliability refers to the accuracy of truth-
fulness determination. Validity is the degree to which the test actually measures what it
purports to measure. Validity must be established on a representative sample of sub-
jects.
14. See note 55, and text accompanying notes 144-46, infra.
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restraints which can result in outright prohibition or a more enlight-
ened approach to testing in the context of labor arbitration. However,
it should become clear that a more general approach is probably nec-
essary in order to reach the prospective employee, the individual most
susceptible to such testing, and in order to develop uniform control of
such testing. The threat to personal liberties will be examined in the
context of constitutional protections with the suggestion that a uni-
form protection from such testing may be constitutionally required.
Finally, possible statutory restraints on such testing will be examined
as a means to protect effectively the individual from the misuse of
employment testing.
The accuracy of polygraph determinations and the predictive value
of psychological testing have been examined by the scientific com-
munity. Generally, psychologists have concluded that the usefulness of
the polygraph test depends upon the technician's method of adminis-
tering the test and of interpreting the subject's responses. They have
also concluded that the accuracy of the standardized personality test
depends upon the nature of the validating process. While one cannot
demand infallibility in terms of the accuracy of these techniques, some
high degree of confidence is required both by the recipient of the results,
and by the general community which finds itself increasingly com-
pelled to submit to such testing. Recent criticism of mental ability,
scholastic aptitude, and personality tests reflects concern that these
instruments may discriminate against racial and ethnic minorities due
to a cultural bias in the tests. 15
15. See Cooper & Sobol. Seniority and Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A
General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REv.
1598 (1969). Cooper and Sobol observe that general patterns of racial discrimination.
inferior educational and cultural opportunities for black people, and cultural separa-
tism impede blacks in attaining the background necessary for success on standardized
tests. A consequence of this discrimination and segregation is blacks' lower average
score on most standardized intelligence tests. Id. at 1640. See also, Developments in the
Law--Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 84
HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1119-45 (1971).
It is equally true that lack of verbal skills and variations in cultural experience have
substantial effects on the performance of blacks on standardized personality tests. It has
been argued that personality tests, in their self-fulfilling determinations of undesirable
character traits, discriminate and perpetuate prejudices.
[I]t is probable that whenever we use personality tests in selection, we capitalize
upon, and perpetuate, all sorts of prejudices, more subtle, less understood, and
perhaps more profound and in the very long run even more destructive than those
regarding race.
Lovell, The Humnan Use of Personality Test.s: a Dissenting View. 22 A %i. PsCH01 OGIST
383, 388 (1967). See also APA Task Force on Employment Testing of Minority
Vol. 47: 73, 1971
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The conflict of polygraph and psychological testing with such civil
liberties as freedom from self-incrimination and the right of privacy
presents the most serious problem to be resolved by political and legal
authorities. While it is conceded even by the proponents of these tests
that the consent of individuals should be obtained to the fullest extent
possible, a wholly voluntary consent is often precluded by the job ap-
plicant's limited employment alternatives. Economic coercion is pre-
sent even when an employer merely requests test results; the prospec-
tive employee feels compelled to satisfy the employer's wishes in order
to enhance the possibility of obtaining the job. The problem becomes]
one of balancing privacy and related rights against the information)
gained through the use of the test instruments.
Labor unions provide a measure of protection to their members in
their dealings with employers and this often includes the protection
against submission to polygraph and psychological testing during the
term of employment. The prospective employee, however, is often
beyond the reach of the collective bargaining contract. It then must be
a matter for the legal and political community to determine the extent
to which the employer may require submission of a prospective em-
ployee to polygraph and psychological testing as a condition of em-
ployment. This article will examine the present limitations on such a




Polygraph instruments do not measure lying, or even psychological
states that accompany lying; they measure physiological change gen-
erated in the subject by emotional stress.' 6 Research seems to indicate
Groups, Job Testing and the Disadvantaged, 24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 637, 641-42 (1969),
calling for studies to determine whether there are in fact differing patterns of test va-
lidity for Negroes and whites on standardized tests.
16. WESTIN, supra note 8, at 212-13. As early as the third century B.C., Erasistratus
is reported to have observed that emotion caused a quickening of the pulse. HousE
COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, USE OF POLYGRAPHS AS "LIE DETECTORS" BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, H.R. Doc. No. 198, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT ON POLYGRAPHS].
The first reported attempt to use an instrument to detect deception occurred in 1895
when Cesare Lombroso adapted the "hydrosphymograph" (which measured blood pres-
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that blood pressure variations most satisfactorily indicate physiolog-
ical change due to the emotional stress of lying.17 In 1915, William
Moulton Marston, a criminal lawyer, began systematic research at the
Harvard Psychological Laboratory into the correlation between lying
and changes in blood pressure. 18 Marston hypothesized that the act of
deception is accompanied by a release of additional nervous energy
which results in measurable increases in the strength of the subject's
heartbeat and in his systolic blood pressure. 19 He further assumed that
this reaction cannot be voluntarily controlled. However, Marston was
aware that other mental and emotional activities tend both to raise
and lower the systolic blood pressure.2 0
Marston's experimental work aroused the interst of John A. Larson,
a psychologist associated with the Berkeley, California police force. It
was Larson who first developed an apparatus which measured both
respiration and blood pressure. 21 In 1921 Larson devised an instru-
ment capable of simultaneously recording blood pressure, pulse, and
respiratory changes. 22 He theorized, as had Marston, that there are
certain physical concomitants of emotion which reflect stress caused
by guilt in lying. 23
Larson was joined in his work by Leonarde Keeler, a psychology
graduate of Stanford University, who in 1926 developed a more satis-
factory instrument. 24 The modified apparatus consisted of three units:
sure) to record pulse changes in order to evaluate the truthfulness of a subject's re-
sponse. In 1914, Vittorio Benussi reported that changes in respiration were also related
to the truthfulness of a response. J. REID & F. INBAU. Truth and Deception, 1, 2 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as REID & INBAU].
17. Burtt, Further Techniquefor Inspiration Expiration Ratio, 4 J. Exp. PsYcIIOL-
OGY 106 (1921).
18. W. MARSTON, TIlE LIE DETECTOR TEST. 46 (1938) [hereinafter cited as MAR-
STON ] -
19. Id. at 165, 166.
20. Id. at 166.
21. Id. at 50.
22. 1967 S. REPORr. supra note 8, at 9. See also, J. LARSON. LYING AND ITS DE-
CEPTION (1932) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]. Larson reviews the ancient methods of
truth determination: combat, ordeal, and torture, as well as earlier experimentation
with physiological measures and truth determination. Id. at 65-93, 171-253.
The book contains, moreover, the most sophisticated study of lying by a contributor
to the technology of truth determination. Larson classified types of lying (crafty, impul-
sive, and pathological), analyzed the development of untruthfulness in children, and
noted a differentiation in physiological response to lying according to sex. Id. at 3-23.
35-49.
23. Id. at 24-34.
24. I L. KEELER, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLICE SCIENCE 39-40 (1930).
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one recording continuously and quantitatively blood pressure and
pulse; another giving a duplicate blood pressure-pulse curve taken
from some other part of the subject's body or, in the alternative, mea-
suring muscular reflexes of the arm or leg; the third recording respira-
tion.25
Keeler attempted to answer early criticism that "much of the suc-
cess of the blood-pressure technique in detection of deception and
guilt" was attributable "to the psychological effect such a test has on
the suspect in bringing about confessions. '26 Keeler argued that his
experiments showed that emotional tension created by anger or fear of
false accusation, which could also produce distolic blood-pressure,
could be reduced through a pre-examination session with the exam-
ining technician.27 Moreover, in Keeler's estimation, the pattern of
responses and machine measurements throughout questioning, even
irrelevant questioning, is related to veracity. Keeler formed the Keeler
Polygraph Institute in Chicago in 1938, where he further developed
his instrument to include a galvanometer for recording electrodermal
or galvanic skin reflex. 28 John E. Reid, in 1945, added a device for
measuring muscular activity after concluding that such activity could
have an effect on the subject's blood pressure. 29 Essentially, however,
Keeler's polygraph remains the instrument most broadly used today as
a "lie detector."
B. Interrogation
It is first necessary to distinguish the polygraph interrogation used for
the determination of guilt of a particular crime from the use of the test
in the pre-employment situation.3 0 In criminal interrogations, the
25. Id. at 40-42. A roll of paper is drawn by a sprocket feeder roll which is driven
by a synchronous motor; the paper supplies the recording chart, and the curves are rec-
orded by means of combined lever arm and fountain pen.
26. Id. at 42.
27. Id. at 42-46. Keeler conducted two experiments; in the first, subjects were ques-
tioned about a playing card which they selected from a group of ten cards, and in the
second, they were questioned about a chosen location on a map. These experiments
produced recorded curves which indicated an increase in blood pressure preceding and
during a disruptive response, followed by a lack of interest and relaxation.
28. REID & INBAU, supra note 16, at 3.
29. Id. at 3.
30. See generally Discussion of Mr. John Reid, of Reid & Associates, a firm special-
izing in polygraphing, in House Polygraph Hearings, supra note 4, at 37.
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examiner is attempting to determine the veracity of the subject with
regard to a specific event; in order to avoid any unnecessary increase
in tension in the subject, the scope of the examination is restricted to
conduct similar in nature to that being investigated. This limitation
restricts the inquiry into the personal life of the subject. On the other
hand, the employment screening test in industry and government is a
broad review of the subject's personal life in order to determine
whether there is any basis for not hiring the particular applicant. While
the use of the device in criminal investigations poses major problems
with regard to reliability 3' and self incrimination, 32 it presents a nar-
rower case of invasion of privacy, both as to the use of "control" ques-
31. See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894. 897 (1962). The Valdez
court cites Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495. cert. denied, 342 U.S.
898 (1951), a case in which the court discussed judicial reluctance to permit lie-detector
evidence in the courtroom. Quoting from F. INBAU & J. REID, LIE DETECTION ,IND
CRIMINAl INTERROGATION 65-66 (3d ed. 1953), the Henderson court stated:
The factors which occasion the chief difficulties in the diagnosis of deception by the
lie-detector technique may be enumerated as follows:
(1) Emotional tension-, "nervousness"-- experienced by a subject who is inno-
cent and telling the truth regarding the offense in question, but who is neverthe-
less affected by,
(a) fear induced by the mere fact that suspicion or accusation has been directed
against him, and particularly so in instances where the subject has been exten-
sively interrogated or perhaps physically abused by investigators prior to the
time of the interview and testing by the lie-detector examiner; and
(b) a guilt complex involving another offense of which he is guilty.
(2) Phsiological abnormalities, such as
(a) excessively high or excessively low blood pressure:
(b) diseases of the heart;
(c) respiratory diseases, etc.
(3) Mental abnormalities, such as
(a) feeblemindedness, as in idiots, imbeciles, and morons;
(b) psychoses and insanities, as in manic depressives. paranoids. schizophren-
ics, paretics, etc.;
(c) psychoneuroses, and psychopathia, as among the so-called "peculiar- or
"'emotionally unstable" persons--those who are neither psychotic nor normal.
and who form the borderline between these two groups.
(4) Unresponsiveness in a lying or guilty subject, because of
(a) lack of fear of detection;
(b) apparent ability to consciously control responses by means of certain
mental sets or attitudes;
(c) a condition of "sub-shock" or "adrenal exhaustion" at the time of the test;
(d) rationalization of the crime in advance of the test to such an extent that
lying about the offense arouses little or no emotional disturbance,
(e) extensive interrogation prior to the test.
(5) Unobserved muscular movements which produce ambiguities or misleading
indications in the blood pressure tracing.
Henderson, 230 P.2d at 501-02.
32. It can be argued that refusal to submit to a polygraph test is prejudicial, and that
the pressure exerted on a suspect by the suspicion or accusation itself means there is
never voluntary consent by an accused to a lie detector test. See, e.g., City of Miami v.
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tions and as to the scope of the examination itself, than is presented in
the employment testing context. Reid and Inbau have described the
"control" question as "a question about an act of wrongdoing of the
same general nature as the main incident under investigation, and
about which the subject in all probability will lie or to which his answer
will be of dubious validity in his own mind." 33 For example, an investi-
gative control question in a case of robbery is, "Did you ever steal any-
thing?" The examiner assumes, first, that robbery is a form of stealing34
and, second, that a subject who denies ever having stolen anything
in his whole life and who does not register as lying is considered either
to be beyond detection by the instrument or to be lying about the
main offense under investigation.35 While the primary purpose of the
control question and other irrelevant questions is to determine the
subject's normal reactions-his "norm"-under test conditions, the
questions invade the privacy of the subject and increasingly do so as
the content of the questions becomes more distant from the subject
under investigation.36
In criminal investigative polygraphy, where one is primarily inter-
ested in whether a suspect committed a specific offense, the only
factor which broadens the examination is the control question. 37 On
Jervis 139 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1962). In persuading a suspect to submit to a lie det-
ector test, one of the investigators told the suspect:
I want to point out one other thing with regard to this lie detector. This is my per-
sonal statement. I don't even know whether it reflects the sentiment of this Board,
but I think whether you consent or do not consent to be tested by the lie detector,
you are, in fact, being tested by it whether you take the test or don't. If you do take
the test, the polygraph shows certain findings; if you don't take the test, one has to
surmise there are good reasons why you don't and that doubt remains in our minds
as to whether or not you have stated the full and exact reason.
Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
33. REID & INBAU, supra note 16, at 19. Use of a sex-related control question in a
case where no sex offense is under investigation may stimulate a greater emotional re-
sponse than a non-sex question related to the kind of conduct actually involved in the
case. Id. at 19 n.33.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Id. at 19 n.24. According to Reid and Inbau, a truthful person will almost al-
ways admit some kind of stealing during his lifetime, or that he at least attempted or
considered stealing.
36. Id. at 20. For instance, in the "robbery hypothetical," Reid and Inbau suggest
that the suspect be asked: "Did you ever steal anything?" If the suspect says "no" the
examiner is directed to ask "You mean in your whole life?" This question is expected to
elicit a response such as: "Well, as a kid, but not since then." In cases where the suspect
insists that he has never stolen anything at anytime in his life, the examiner is instructed
to ask: "Did you ever try to steal anything?" Id. at 19-20.
37. House Polygraph Hearings, supra note 4, at 38.
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the other hand, the pre-employment screening examination poses a
problem with regard to privacy throughout the examination. The
"probing peak of tension" test, which is what pre-employment poly-
graph examination entails, involves drawing the subject out on nu-
merous background areas and noting reactions in any area which
appears particularly bothersome to the suspect. 38 In contrast to crim-
inal investigation, pre-employment screening involves a "fishing expe-
dition." A number of areas are touched upon, any of which may spark
a machine reaction which signals the operator to delve more deeply in
order to gather as much information as possible about the "problem"
area.
One polygraph technician's manual containing instructions for
adapting the polygraph device to pre-employment screening includes
sample questions indicating the scope of the employment test. 39 The
questions, which are accompanied by comments indicating the investi-
gative topics each might lead to, can be loosely fitted into four broad
categories: first, questions about past dishonesty or criminal activity,
detected or undetected, related or unrelated to work; 40 second, ques-
tions about past work record and attitude toward the job for which
application is being made, and underlying motives of the person
seeking employment;4' third, questions about mental or physical
38. Id.
39. R. FERGUSON. THE POLYGRAPH IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY 128-51 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as FERGUSON].
40. The first category is exemplified by the following questions and comments:
77. Have you ever stolen merchandise or materials from a place where you have
worked?
If so, when, where, and how much? (Method of operation, collusion, knowledge
of others who were, or are, presently stealing, sale of merchandise for personal
gain, contacts or fences, arrested for stealing, fired for stealing, asked to resign,
kleptomaniac, shoplifter, job-jumper, falsification of employment background, ar-
rest record, undetected crimes, and many others.)
79. Could you be wanted by the police anywhere for any kind of crime?
If so, what kind, where, and when, and under what circumstances? (Deserted
family; wanted by welfare department. Armed robbery, murder, burglary, auto
theft, rape, grand larceny, embezzlement, fraud, bond jumper, arrest record, prison
escapee, military deserter, and many others.)
Id. at 138.
41. Sample second category questions and comments are:
45. Will you be satisfied with the starting salary?
Does he know what it is; does he care? (Present bills exceed income; how much
does he have to have to get by; bill collectors on his trail, has other source of in-
come, behind in all bills, court judgments outstanding, feels he should have more
money due to experience, job-jumper, made more money on similar job, spoiled by
war wages and never got over it, not dependable, alcoholic, wife forced to work
Vol. 47: 73, 1971
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problems, or about family difficulties which may affect work activity;42
and fourth, questions about accident experiences, personal habits,
political activity, and personal association, any of which may be tan-
gentially related to the likelihood of accident or indicate personal
instability. 43 The questions and the accompanying comments make it
clear that the interest of the examiner is much broader than the ques-
tions (which are themselves intimately personal) and that the ques-
tions are meant to elicit explanatory remarks from the subject from
due to economic condition, plant, lack of education, falsification of application,
better qualified than job calls for, fallen down and climbing back up the ladder,
misfit, theft of money or merchandise under similar salary conditions, and many
others.)
46. Are you seeking long term (temporary) employment with this company?
If not, why not? (Other applications pending, job-jumper, needs just enough
money to move on, setting up crime, summer employment only, presents oppor-
tunity to steal money or merchandise, plant, back injury artist, using job as step-
ping stone only, close relative on job, has friend stealing from company, really
sincere, falsification of application, not qualified, and many others.)
49. Have you ever been asked to resign from a job?
How many times, and for what reasons? (Became involved in a deplorable situa-
tion; couldn't leave women employees alone, pressure from stockholders, criminal
associations, drinking excessively on or off job, violation of company policies,
theft, collusion, individual dishonesty, and many others.)
70. Do you want this job for any reason other than employment?
Communistic activity; seeking trade secrets (setting up for inside theft, setting
up for planned safe job, burglary, or armed payroll robbery; job-jumper, tempo-
rary employment with other jobs pending, sabotage, hiding from family, wanted by
police, undercover agent, plant, and many others).
Id. at 131-32, 133, 137.
42. Ferguson's third category:
50. Have you had any major operations within the past ten years?
How many, what kind, when, and under what circumstances? (Cured; can recur,
prevents applicant from taking some jobs, resulted in nervous condition, ashamed,
disfigured, impotent, operation a failure, psychosomatic, psychoneurotic, crippled,
loves to talk about operation, thinks he or she is only one with such problems, con-
tagious disease, partial or complete hysterectomy, severely injured, wrong diag-
nosis by physician, psychopathic, murderer, cancer, and many others.)
53. Have you ever suffered a nervous breakdown?
If so, when; cause and period of treatment; frequency? (Hospitalized or not,
family problems, mental maladjustment, service connected, mild or severe, unable
to face reality, carries world's problems on his shoulders, criminal act or tenden-
cies, claustrophobia, afraid of height, insecurity, failed in all endeavors, heavily in
debt, amnesia, and many others.)
59. Have you ever filed for, or collected workmen's compensatio.n insurance from
an on the job injury?
If so, when, where, what for, and under what circumstances? (Now collecting for
self, or on behalf of dependent relative, court suit, phony claim, injury artist, ma-
lingering, legitimate injury, paid off others for causing injury, settled out of court,
collusion with unethical lawyer, and many others.)
Id. at 133, 135.
43. Sample fourth category questions and comments:
60. Have you ever had an automobile accident while you were driving?
How many in the past three years? (Location of accidents, chargeable or non-
Washington Law Review Vol. 47: 73, 1971
which the operator can extract an even greater amount of personal
data.
4 4
Most arguments in favor of the use of the polygraph emphasize its
efficiency and its ability to overcome a subject's conscious or uncon-
scious resistance to truthfulness. The efficiency of the instrument con-
trasts favorably with investigative activity; most of the facts revealed
by the test would require weeks of work to discover by ordinary inves-
tigative methods. 45 Second, the inherent "coercion" of polygraph
testing pierces the outer defenses of conscious deception; lies told to
deceive the examiner can be penetrated quickly and the subject can
thus be put into the mood for a complete confession. Third, repressed
beliefs and guilt feelings can be discovered through the use of the poly-
graph. 46 The developers of the polygraph, disregarding the invasion
chargeable, wanted by police for alias tickets, using phony driver's license, driver's
license revoked or suspended, reckless driver, irresponsibility, drives while drink-
ing, phony insurance claims, high accident record, bad eyesight, complete disregard
for safety laws, road hog, fainting spells, and many others.)
74. Do you belong to any group which advocates overthrow of the American
system of government?
Self-explanatory.
75. Are you now or have you ever been a communist sympathizer?
Self-explanatory.
76. Do you actually know anyone who has ever written a threatening letter to the
President or Vice-President of the United States?
Self-explanatory.
88. Have you written any bad or insf checks in the past three years?
If so, where, how many, for how much, and under what circumstances? (Arrest
record, "kited" checks, writes hold-checks between paydays, family problems, how
many out now, alcoholic, showoff, big time "Charlie," gambling, theft of money
and merchandise, bunco artist, check writing sickness or compulsion, and many
others.)
92. Did you every try smoking marijuana?
When and under what circumstances? (Frequency, pusher, trying to beat test,
criminal record, undetected crimes, psychological maladjustment, adult or juve-
nile, and many others.)
Id. at 135, 136-37, 138, 140-41.
44. Ferguson presents a hypothetical affirmative response to a question:
For example, if a subject answers yes to having had a rupture or hernia opera-
tion, the examiner would possibly make the following notation in the blank spaces
alloted:
No. 56. Suffered rupture while lifting barrels of wax while employed for Blank
Company, in July of 1956. Was operated on in Allen City Hospital, and did not
return to work for six weeks. Filed for, and collected, workmen's compensation
insurance. No suit or settlement involved. Returned to work. No such problems
since.
Id. at 141.
45. MARSTON, supra note 18 at 137-38.
46. This very fact has given some pause with regard to the use of polygraph exami-
nations which may be recording feelings of repressed guilt about a matter entirely unre-
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of privacy, extoll this creation of self-awareness. By stripping away
disguises, mental masquerades, and deceptions, the polygraph exami-
nation is said to act as a purgative to the personality, freeing it from
all kinds of twists, repressions and emotional conflicts.
Generally, criticism of pre-employment screening by polygraphing
can be divided into four categories. 47 First, the polygraph is designed
to obtain a response with regard to a specific incident. Its utility for
determining a broad question such as the suitability of an individual
for a particular position is marginal when the broad inquiry is being
made for predictive purposes. It is doubtful that the polygraph is a re-
liable means of determining whether an individual will be a good
worker, or will be dependable, or will steal.48 Second, the nature of
the inquiry during pre-employment screening is to focus on past acts,
a focus appropriate for criminal investigation but which is entirely
inappropriate in the context of future employee conduct. The
pre-employment screening examination extracts information and
implicity executes judgment for the offense. It negates the possibility
of reformation. That a person stole some pencils five years previously
may or may not be a good indicator that he will steal in industry or
business. While criminal polygraph examination verifies past conduct,
the polygraph in personnel selection attempts to predict future con-
duct. It is doubtful that it can do So. 49 Third, the use of the polygraph
in pre-employment screening, even in critical areas such as national
lated to the subject at hand. See Derman & Smith, Unconscious Moderation and the
Polygraph Test, 119 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1017-20, (1963). They describe the routine
examination of a bank employee who showed a "violent" reaction to the question,
"Have you ever stolen any money from the bank or its customers?" Subsequent investi-
gation revealed that no money, in fact, had been stolen. The subject had "ambivalent"
feelings toward his mother and "unconsciously identified" his wife with his mother. Psy-
chiatric examination indicated that reaction to the test question was in response to the
word "customer" with which he associated his mother and wife regarding embarrassing
financial dealings he had had with them.
47. Congressman Cornelius Gallagher has summarized the overwhelming objections
to employment polygraphing:
In my opinion, lie detector tests constitute an insidious search of the human mind
and are a breach of the most fundamental of human rights. They provide a vehicle
of excursion into the most private recesses of the human mind. Even if the poly-
graph testing was trustworthy, there is still no possible justification for such "mental
wiretapping." I believe the lie detector test under any compulsion is a violation of
the fourth amendment to the Constitution. Its use upon Federal employees and job
applicants is especially repugnant and should be stopped now-today.
HOUSE REPORT ON POLYGRAPHS, supra note 16, at 43.
48. House Polygraph Hearings, supra note 4, at 304.
49. Id. at 306. a
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security, is ill-conceived since those individuals who are supposed to
be ferreted out by the test often go undetected. 50
Finally, there are fundamental civil libertarian objections to the use
of the polygraph as a pre-employment screening device. 51 The use of
polygraphs is degrading and manifests a general distrust for the
worker. The dignity of man is the issue. General use of this instrument
subjects the majority of innocent, trustworthy employees to testing,
yet the lie detector is basically an instrument of distrust, which should
be used only where there is a strong suspicion that the individual is
not telling the truth. Moreover, the use of the polygraph violates sci-
entific integrity, since the advertised use implies a scientific accuracy
that has yet to be proved.
The probing questions of a pre-employment polygraph examination
may be injurious to the subject both as a consequence of their "sug-
gestiveness" 52 and the danger of the misuse of the record made of the
responses. The polygraph screening examination converts the instru-
ment into a blindly probing tool that can damage severely the reputa-
tion or even the mental stability of the person tested. The personal
and sensitive questions tend very easily to charge the emotions and
may be misinterpreted by the operator. A record of the subject's res-
ponses may find its way into the personnel file of the company and be
transmitted as "reference material" when the worker leaves the em-
ploy of the company.53 By stripping away the subject's defenses, ex-
posing his personality and forcing him to confront guilt feelings,
pre-employment polygraphy may thereby deny him the opportunity
for reformation which comes through denial and rationalization. It
50. See HOUSE REPORT ON POLYGRAPHS, supra note 16, at 44. Dr. Stefan T. Possony.
of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and an authority on international
communism, argued that "the Government judges the responses to questions about
sexual activity are so victorian that often the active, virile male, who possesses the initia-
tive, creativity, and drive needed for intelligence work, is disqualified. In contrast, the
undersexed male, the homosexual, and the communist agent who is instructed in how to
beat the machine, are capable of passing the test with flying colors." Id.
51. See generally Testimony of Dr. Joseph F. Kubis, Department of Psychology.
Fordham University, House Polygraph Hearings, supra note 4, at 303.
52. The psychological effect of "suggestiveness" results in the subject becoming
convinced of his guilt of an offense of which he is innocent, or in the subject becoming
preoccupied with the substance of the questions such as feelings of guilt. For an example
of "suggestiveness" resulting in a false confession to a homicide see F. SHAPIRO. Wti r-
MORE (1969).
53. See, e.g., A. MIILER, TIEAgSAULrON PRIVACY 96(1971).
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perhaps deprives the subject the refuge of lying, which may be a ne-
cessity for stable life in a complex society.54
Since the use of the polygraph screening examination might se-
verely compromise the dignity and impugn the integrity of the subject,
it is significant that other, less offensive means are available for ob-
taining information which may correctly serve as the basis for any
employment decision. For the most part, there are available records,
or the possibility of developing investigative reports, concerning the
past criminal activity and past work experience and attitude. The cost
to the employer is, of course, greater than the cost of polygraphing.
However, this cost must be weighed against the sacrifice of the indi-
vidual dignity of the prospective employee who is compelled to un-
dergo polygraphing. Any information relating to mental and physical
conditions, a family situation, accident experience, or personal habits,
associations or beliefs may be relevant to some degree in making an
informed employment decision. Certainly there are risks to the em-
ployer and to other employees if a subject possesses personal charac-
teristics or physical defects which are not determined before employ-
ment. Yet, these risks may be properly borne by the employer where
there is a great sacrifice of human dignity and privacy, as there is in
54. Theologians have recognized a value in truth evasion and have legitimized it by
the notion of mental reservation. If for instance a child is asked if his mother is home,
and in fact she is but does not wish to be bothered by a salesman, the child may answer,
"No," meaning, "No, my mother is not home to you." For a general discussion of mor-
ally permissible lying see HIGHER CATECHETICAL INSTITUTE AT NIJMEGAN, DE NIEUWE
KATECHISMUS (THE NEW CATECHISM) 442-43 (Eng. transl. 1967), wherein the argument
is made:
The lie is opposed to the truth. It is a distortion of reality. It makes a person
unreliable. Hence in truth or lying we are concerned with the mutual trust and
confidence by which we rely on one another. A complication arises from the fact
that mutual confidence also involves the keeping of secrets. There is a natural
feeling of reserve about personal matters affecting oneself or others. People do not
tell all comers about everything that happens in their homes. Each of us has a cer-
tain right to a certain privacy. Hence for instance, there is also the professional se-
cret. Doctors and others whose duties bring them into contact with the private lives
of other people are bound to secrecy....
It may sometimes happen, however, that there is a risk of a secret's being re-
vealed, as when tricky or impertinent questions are asked. Only an untruth can
preserve secrecy and hence our reliance on one another. If for instance someone
asks a doctor in a certain case, from which clear deductions can be made, whether
he has had a visit from a certain patient,.an evasive answer might only mean, yes,
he had. In such a case the doctor may or must simply say No....
, * . It is of the nature of language that men should be able to conceal something
from others, and this is something that everyone knows. There is no breach of mu-
tual confidence. And hence it evades the charge of lying. It is not a real lie.
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screening polygraphy, in order to obtain what may be only marginally
useful information.
C. The Legal Status of the Polygraph
The polygraph has not gone unnoticed by the legal system. The
courts have focused primarily on the unproven reliability of the instru-
ment, while arbitration tribunals have considered not only the relia-
bility of the test but also the infringement of civil liberties resulting
from its use. The legislatures of several states have limited the use of
the "lie detector" following attacks by labor unions on the frequent
requirement of polygraph testing as a condition of employment, and
also due to widespread concern over the use of an instrument of un-
proven reliability. 55
1. Judicial Treatment of the Polygraph
The earliest and most systematic consideration of the reliability of
polygraphy occurred in the courts in the context of criminal prosecu-
tions. Frye v. United States,56 decided in 1923, is the first reported
case rejecting the admission of polygraph testimony. After examining
the nature and theory of polygraphy, the court in Frye upheld the
lower court's exclusion of expert testimony concerning the results of a
polygraph test on the basis that "the systolic blood pressure test has
not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiol-
ogical and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in
55. The question of reliability was given extensive attention in Skolnick, Scientific
Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961).
Therein the reliability of the polygraph as a lie detector was seriously challenged and
found particularly inappropriate for pre-employment screening. The author stated:
The scientific basis for lie detection is questionable. There seems to be little evi-
dence that upholds the claim to a regular relationship between lying and emotion:
there is even less to support the conclusion that precise inferences can be drawn
from the relationship between emotional change and physiological response.
Whatever the unconditional accuracy of the lie detector, the number of false pos-
itives it diagnoses is going to be related to the number of true positives in the popu-
lation being tested. This fact would make the use of lie detectors, even if they had
high unconditional accuracy, questionable in those situations-such as personnel
screening-in which there are a few true positives in the population.
Id. at 727.
56. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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admitting expert testimony deduced from discovery, development, and
experiments thus far made. '57 Generally, state courts have followed
the Frye decision rejecting the admission into evidence of the results
of the polygraph test, on the basis of its unproven reliability.58
57. Id. at 1014. A decade after Frye, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a ruling
of the inadmissibility of test results, observing:
We are not satisfied that this instrument, during the ten years that have elapsed
since the decision in the Frye case, has progressed from the experimental to the
demonstrable stage.
State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933). The Wisconsin court cited Wig-
more's recognition of the possible utility of the "blood pressure method of lie detection,"
noting that:
[T] he record of psychometric achievement with testimony is still meager . . . the
conditions required for truly scientific observation and experiment are seldom
practicable. The testimonial mental processes are so complex and variable that
millions of instances must be studied before safe generalizations can be made.
Id., 246 N.W. at 317.
The admission of polygraph evidence met with momentary success in New York,
where a court heard evidence that the device was one hundred percent accurate. People
v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1938). After considering the testi-
mony of an expert witness as to this phenomenal capacity of the machine, the court con-
cluded:
For hundreds of years our courts have deemed the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses in open court to be the best method so far devised
for the ascertainment of the truth and have used that method for lack of any better
approach. It seems to me that the pathometer and the technique by which it is used
indicates a new and more scientific approach to the ascertainment of truth in legal
investigations.
Id., 3 N.Y.S.2d at 351. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals of New York in the same
year rejected the admission of polygraph evidence indicating that the condition pre-
cedent to the acceptance of polygraph evidence would be expert testimony that the poly-
graph posesses
such value that reasonable certainty can follow from tests. Until such a fact, if it
be a fact, is demonstrated by qualified experts in respect to the "lie detector," we
cannot hold as a matter of law that error was committed in refusing to allow de-
fendant to experiment with it.
People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 294, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1938).
Other limited uses of the polygraph by investigative and prosecuting authorities are
condoned in Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A.2d 389, 392-93 (1941). This
case held that the use of a lie detector along with prolonged incommunicado question-
ing, even where trick was used, did not vitiate a confession. See also State v. Dehart,
242 Wis. 562, 8 N.W.2d 360, 362 (1943); LeFevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d
288, 292-93 (1943). But see Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P.2d 111, 117, 118-20
(1945).
58. Besides the New York and Wisconsin opinions, cited in note 57, supra, opinions
rejecting the admission of polygraph data are: People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2
N.W.2d 503, 505 (1942) (on the basis of unreliability); State v. Cole, 35 Mo. 181, 188
S.W.2d 43, 50-51 (1945) (because it was prejudicial to conduct polygraph tests before
the judge and because of lack of proof that the instrument had sufficient scientific sup-
port); State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147, 149-52 (1947) (holding that, absent
argument and stipulation, test records and examiner's interpretation are inadmissible);
Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) (upheld exclusion on the basis of
unreliability, although concurring opinion argued that where the defendant voluntarily
submitted to testing the results should be admitted); People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App.
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It is also generally true that parties will not be permitted to intro-
duce indirectly the fact that a witness's testimony has been scrutinized
by polygraph testing,59 nor will the courts receive evidence of refusal
or willingness to take the test. The underlying reasoning is that the
fact finder would be unable to assess the evidence without an as yet
unavailable knowledge of the reliability of lie detector tests in general. °
Statements in several opinions which refuse to permit direct and
indirect introduction of polygraph evidence imply that stipulations
made before the taking of the examination may be enough to allow
admission. 6 1 In LeFevre v. State,62 which represents the majority posi-
tion, the prosecutor prepared stipulations to the effect that either the
state or the defendant could use the finding of a proposed lie detector
test. When the defendant sought to admit the results of a favorable
2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950); People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957):
People v. Aragon 154 Cal. App. 2d 646, 316 P.2d 370 (1957); State v. Pusch. 77 N.D.
860, 46 N.W.2d 508, 520-21 (1951) (upholding exclusion of polygraph evidence noting a
distinction between use of a polygraph during investigation and use of polygraph results
as trial evidence bearing directly upon truthfulness of statements made by a party who
is being examined and as evidence of guilt or innocence); Henderson v. State. 94 Okla.
Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951) (reviewing psychological and mental conditions which
can account for polygraph results and which negate reliability, and noting further im-
pairment of cross examination caused by use of the polygraph); Kaminski ". State. 63
So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953)(holding not only that results of lie detection tests were inadmis-
sible, but that neither was testimony as to the taking of the test offered for the purpose
of rehabilitating a witness); State v. Casle, 150 Me. 310. 110 A.2d 225 (1954); State v.
Nlottran, 158 Me. 325, 184 A.2d 225 (1962): Lee v. Commonwealth. 200 Va. 233. 105
S.E.2d 152 (1958); Central Mutual Ins. Co. v. D. & B., Inc.. 340 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1960); State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961); State v. Foyle.
354 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961); Commonwealth v. Bonmiller. 194 Pa. Super.
448. 169 A.2d 347 (1961); State v. Walker. 37 N.J. 208, 181 A.2d 1 (1962): People v.
Boney. 281 Ill. 2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920 (1963): Commonwealth v. Fatalo. 346 Mass.
266. 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963).
59. See, e.g., People v. Aragon, 154 Cal. App. 2d 646, 316 P.2d 370 (1957) (state-
ments with reference to a lie detector test which had been introduced into a case were
held prejudicial); Haynes v. State, 292 P.2d 442 (Okla. 1956) (defendant's testimony that
after arrest he voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test was excluded); State v. Veros.
67 N.M. 19, 363 P.2d 629 (1961) (testimony indirectly giving the results of a poly-
graph test was held inadmissible even though there was no objection).
60. See, e.g., State v. Rowe, 77 Wn.2d 955, 468 P.2d 1000 (1970), wherein the court
observed that "Is] ince it is generally held that polygraph tests are not judicially accepta-
ble, . . . it is obvious that a defendant should not be permitted to introduce evidence
of his professed willingness to take such a test." Id. at 958, 468 P.2d at 1003. Accord,
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A.2d 442 (1956); State v. Kolander. 236
Minn. 209. 52 N.W.2d 458 (1952); Haynes v. State, 292 P.2d 442 (Okla. Crim. 1956).
61. See, e.g., State v. Rowe 77 Wn.2d 955, 468 P.2d 1000 (1970), in which the court
noted that "[t] he examination was given, although there was no stipulation concerning
in admissibility of the results." Id. at 958. 468 P.2d at 1002.
62. 242 Wis. 416.8 N.W.2d 288 (1943).
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test, the court refused. 63 This exclusionary rule is the only one that
can be consistently maintained where polygraph test results are other-
wise excluded because of invalidity; no stipulation can remedy the
invalidity finding. However, in People v. Houser64 polygraph evi-
dence, offered by the state was admitted upon first, a stipulation by the
defendant, in writing, that the operator was an expert, and second,
upon a waiver by the defendant of his right against self-incrimination
in answering the examination questions. The court concluded that,
given the stipulation and waiver:65
It would be difficult to hold that defendant should now be permitted on
this appeal to take advantage of any claim that such operator was not
an expert and that, as to the result of the test, such evidence was inad-
missible....
It should be observed that the court in Houser substituted
self-incrimination as the rationale for the general exclusionary rule
rather than unreliability. Nevertheless, the Iowa Supreme Court fol-
lowed People v. Houser while conceding that reliability of polygraph
evidence is still a matter of dispute.66 The most sophisticated treat-
ment of the acceptance of polygraph evidence upon stipulation is that
found in State v. Valdez.67 Wary of the reliability of polygraph testi-
63. See Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951), where the appellate
court refused admission of stipulated test results obtained by direction of the trial court.
In refusing the court stated:
We are not unmindful of the fact that at the direction of the trial court, the parties
agreed to submit to the tests, but whether by voluntary agreement, court direction,
or coercion, the results of such tests do not attain the stature of competent evid-
ence.
Id. at 174. See also State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788, 789 (1961), where the
court held that "[t] he signing of a waiver did not alter the rule with regard to the ad-
missibility of [polygraph] evidence."
64. 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948).
65. Id., 193 P.2d at 942.
66. State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W. 2d 568 (1960).
67. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962). In Valdez, the Arizona court first reviewed
in some detail the chief difficulties in the diagnosis of deception by the lie detector tech-
nique, including (I) nervousness of the subject who is innocent and telling the truth, (2)
physiological abnormalities, (3) mental abnormalities, (4) unresponsiveness in a lying
or guilty subject, and (5) unobserved muscular movements which produce ambiguities
or misleading indications. Id., 371 P.2d at 897-98. Second, the court noted the objec-
tions to unrestricted use of the polygraph technique: (1) the tendency to treat lie detector
evidence as conclusive; (2) the lack of standardization of test procedure; and (3) the dif-
ficulty a layman encounters in evaluating the examiner's opinions. Id., 371 P.2d at 898.
Finally, the court held that polygraph evidence and expert testimony related to it were
admissible upon written stipulation by the prosecutor, the defendant and his counsel,
and when the court in its discretion finds that the examiner was qualified and that the
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mony, the Arizona court permitted the use of such evidence only
where the parties consent by stipulation, the trial court permits chal-
lenge of the reliability of the polygraph evidence by the party to
whom it is adverse, and the jury is instructed not to consider poly-
graph evidence as conclusive.
2. The Polygraph and Labor Arbitration
The polygraph becomes an issue in the labor context in many of the
same investigatory and accusatory situations faced by the courts.
Other labor uses include periodic screening of employees and assisting
in promotion decisions. While no reported arbitration decision has
involved the use of the instrument in a pre-employment context, and
while arbitration decisions are not binding as precedents, they are use-
ful, nevertheless, in assessing the status of the polygraph in industry.
In Marathon Electric Manufacturing Corp. v. Local 1116, UA W,68
the arbitrator, in rejecting polygraph evidence, focused on the chal-
lenge to its validity: 69
[TI he polygraph is not a reliable scientific instrument for the ascer-
tainment of truth. Under favorable conditions, deception may be indi-
cated by a specific response in either blood pressure or respiration. At
the present state of development of the polygraph, even its most ardent
advocates do not claim that its accuracy is more than 75 percent.
A second basis for ruling that the opinion of the polygraph operator
was not admissible was its inferiority to witness testimony or material
test conditions were proper. Other factors which must exist in order to allow the stipula-
tion are: the ability of the party opposing admission to cross-examine the test examiner
as to his qualifications; the conditions under which the test was conducted, and the limi-
tations of and possibilities for error in polygraphing; and the jury must have been in-
structed that the polygraph evidence does not tend to prove or disprove any element of
the crime but, at most, tends only to indicate that at the time of the examination the de-
fendant was not telling the truth. Id., 371 P.2d at 900-01.
68. Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. 1040 (1959). Therein the arbitrator
was faced with a dispute of the admissibility of evidence in a case involving discharge
for industrial espionage. See also Brass-Craft Mfg. Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1177. 1182 (1961).
69. Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. 1040, 1041 (1959). See Continental
Air Transp. Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 778, 780 (1962), wherein the decision-maker stated: "The
Arbitrator holds these tests have no probative value and are not admissible as evidence
in these proceedings." See also Dayton Steel Foundry Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 745, 746-47
(1962).
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evidence of misconduct.70 Nevertheless, the arbitrator conceded that
the lie detector was useful in compelling self-incriminating statements, 71
and suggested that, "voluntary stipulations would undoubtedly make
such tests admissible in Arbitration proceedings .... ,,72
Where the results of polygraph evidence have been accepted by the
arbitrator, it has not been done without reservation. In Wilkof Steel &
Supply Co. v. Teamsters Local 92,73 the arbitrator took the position
that all available information and evidence ought to be considered
and that appropriate weight would be assigned at his discretion to
each piece of evidence. Nevertheless, after observing that polygraph
evidence was subjective and at best "indicative," the arbitrator con-
cluded that the test before him was superficial, and that although
more probative questioning might be given more weight, such test re-
suits would still remain hearsay.
Given the reluctance of arbitrators to admit polygraph evidence on
employee misconduct, a related question arises. Can an employee be
discharged for refusing to submit to a polygraph examination? In Lag
Drug Co. v. Teamsters Local 723,74 the employee, as a condition of
employment, signed an agreement to take lie detector tests at any
time; the agreement included a proviso that he could be dismissed for
refusing. The arbitrators nevertheless concluded: 75
70. The arbitrator observed:
Even where opinion evidence is admitted it is necessary that the professional wit-
ness testify personally as to his opinion so that his testimony may be evaluated after
the acid test of cross-examination has been applied to it.
Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. 1040, 1042 (1959).
71. "Their most important use, however, is the psychological effect they produce in
inducing admissions from guilty individuals." Id. at 1041.
72. Id. at 1042.
73. 39 Lab. Arb. 883 (1962). Therein the arbitrator ruled that the
[w]eight to be given to a polygraph examination can be indicative, at best; it
cannot be conclusive ...but the very nature of the examination is subjective-
whether it be affirmative or negative.
Id. at 885. The arbitrator further observed that evidence of failure to take a polygraph
examination was weightless.
74. 39 Lab. Arb. 1121 (1962).
75. Id. at 1123. See Publishers Ass'n of New York City, 32 Lab. Arb. 44 (1959). The
refusal to submit to a polygraph examination was held not prejudicial since the arbi-
trator was required to judge the credibility of witnesses on the basis of testimony and
evidence submitted at the hearing. Id. at 48-49. See also Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 39 Lab.
Arb. 470, 479 (1962). A door is opened to possible mandatory submission to polygra-
phy, not on the basis of consent generally given at the time of employment, but by con-
sent obtained by confronting the employee with other evidence of culpable acts. It
should be observed, however, that this poses serious problems of self-incrimination.
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In view, however, of the overwhelming weight of impartial scientific
authority that these lie detector tests are not accurate and legal au-
thority that they do not constitute competent evidence and invade the
right of privacy and the constitutional rights against self-incrimination,
this Board cannot uphold such a requirement in this case.
Although the arbitrators did not reach the question of "whether the
company could properly refuse to hire an employee based upon his
refusal to take a lie detector test or his failure to take the test," 76 they
did refuse to enforce the employer's contract, reasoning that wide-
spread use of individual contracts would undermine the collective
bargaining position of the union. From Lag Drug it can be argued
that required polygraph testing is unconscionable in a non-union set-
ting, given the superior bargaining power of the employer.
In Allen Industries, Inc., v. Local 986, UA W,7 7 the arbitrators took
the contrary position and held that refusal to submit to a polygraph
test at the employer's request was insubordination and grounds for
dismissal. The facts and reasoning of the decision, however, warrant
its treatment as a special case. The employee was accused of theft on
the basis of substantial circumstantial evidence. 78 The refusal to
submit to a polygraph examination indicated to the arbitrators "a
complete failure to respond affirmatively to requests that appear to us
to be reasonable, to cooperate with the Company in its effort to find
out who was responsible for what happened." 79 The narrowness of the
Allen Industries holding is evident when viewed alongside the decision
in General American Transportation Corp. v. United Steelworkers
Local 1133. 8o There, a group of workers had been paid for nonexis-
tent work and the employer sought to recoup by administering poiy-
graph tests to alj workers in order to identify the employees respon-
76. Lag Drug Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1121, 1122-23 (1962).
77. 26 Lab Arb. 363 (1956).
78. The arbitrators held that this circumstantial evidence created a prima facie case
of guilt and that a burden was placed on the employee to refute it.
79. Allen Industries, Inc., 26 Lab. Arb. 363, 369 (1956). The underlying premises of
the decision were: (1) "While a lie detector test is far from perfect and while it may have
many shortcomings, it is very difficult to see how the taking of such a test by X could in
any way adversely affect his interest if he has no knowledge [of the misconduct] : (2)
the employee "should be more eager to take a lie detector test in order to clear himself
emphatically;" and (3) "it is the duty of every employee to assist the company in every
way to prevent theft. ... Id. at 399.
80. 31 Lab. Arb. 355, 356 (1958).
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sible for the fa.lsified reports. In holding thdit required submission to
polygraph testing was unwarranted, the arbitrator observed: 81
Although new wonders of technology are brought home to us every
day, the time has not come when management can consign to a ma-
chine the job of supervision, especially when this machine is to take
the employee in- its embrace and measure his most intimate vital proc-
esses.
The general rle to be derived from Allen Industries and General
American is that:82
The arbitrator does not say that in the proper instances the lie detector
might not be the reasonable next step, but rather than for it to be used
wholesale, there must at least be a basis for a formal accusation against
the subject.
Where there is no evidence connecting particular employees with spe-
cific misconduct, neither evidence of test results for which consent has
been obtained, nor refusal to submit to further tests will be admitted
merely on the basis of prior consent to testing. In B. F. Goodrich Co.
v. Teamsters Local 743,83 the arbitrator specifically rejected the no-
tion that pre-employment "consent" affected the admissibility of poly-
graph test results. While conceding possible reliability, the arbitrator
viewed the consent as a nullity, observing: 84
The implicit social threat to an employee in the setting of a plant
community were he to refuse to submit to lie detector testing where
crimes have concededly been committed so compels consent that a
guiltless but emotionally fearful employee has practically no choice
but to consent to a testing procedure where infallibility is not fully
present.
Arbitration decisions are instructive in considering two persistent
problems of employment screening: first, the broad scope of the in-
quiry; and second, the compromise of the personal integrity of the
prospective employee. The scope of pre-employment examinations
was illustrated in United Mills, Inc. v. Central States Jt. Bd., Amal-
81. Id. at 364.
82. Id.
83. 36 Lab. Arb. 553, 556 (1961).
84. Id. at 558.
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gamnated Clothing Workers,85 where several employees were dis-
charged, "for negligence and not for theft," after large inventory
losses were discovered. They were to be rehired if they were cleared
by a lie detector examination. 86 The arbitrator held that the offer of
reinstatement on condition of submission to polygraphing was unac-
ceptable.87 While the inquiry might be narrower than that involved in
a periodic examination of the employee's work conduct, or in
pre-employment screening, nevertheless, the scope of the inquiry in
United Mills was not found to be sufficiently narrow to justify manda-
tory submission to polygraph testing.
The invasion of privacy which necessarily accompanies polygraphy
has furnished an independent ground for holdings of inadmissibility
in some arbitration decisions 88 and has been a significant considera-
tion in others. 89 Apprehension about the invasion of privacy occa-
sioned by the use of the polygraph was voiced by the arbitrator in
General A nerican:9 °
85. 39 Lab. Arb. 1259, 1260 (1963).
86. Id. at 1261.
87. The reported opinion observes:
It is at least doubtful that such evidence can be held admissible. Apart from that, it
is questionable whether such a test would be of any real value in this case. The pur-
pose of a lie detector test is to determine whether a witness is telling the truth. The
grievants here are not charged with theft or making false statements about the in-
ventory losses, they are charged with incompetence, gross negligence or wanton
disregard of their responsibilities. The Company does not allege any specific acts of
incompetence or negligence to support the general charge. Absent such specificity
there can be no proper foundation for a polygraph examination or for meaningful
evaluation of responses.
Id.
88. See Town and Country Food Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 332, 335 (1962). The arbitrators
held: "Under such circumstances the Company's demand that the four men take 'lie
detector' test or face discharge for insubordination was an inva.sion of privacy and an
unreasonable and unwarranted exercise of management rights." (emphasis added).
89. See Lag Drug Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1121 (1962). The arbitrator, in refusing to re-
quire submission to polygraph testing, stated:
The Board is mindful of the serious financial problem confronting this Company as
a result of pilferage. In view, however, of the overwhelming weight of impartial sci-
entific authority that these lie detector tests are not accurate and legal authority that
they do not constitute competent evidence and invade the right f privaei and the
constittttional right against self-incrinzination, this Board cannot uphold such a
requirement in this case.
Id. at 1123 (emphasis added). See also Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 39 Lab Arb. 407, 409
(1962).
90. General Am. Transp. Corp.. 31 Lab. Arb. 355, 363 (1958) (quoting from an
unreported New Jersey court case).
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[l]f we admit such an encroachment upon the personal immunity of
an individual where in principle can we stop? Suppose medical dis-
covery in the future evolves a technique whereby the truth may infal-
libly be secured from a witness by trespassing his skull and testing the
functions of the brain beneath. No one would contend that the witness
could be forced against his will to undergo such a major operation at
the imminent risk of his life, in order to secure evidence in a suit be-
tween private parties. How then can he be forced to undergo a less
dangerous operation, and at what point shall the line be drawn? To my
mind, it is not the degree of risk to life, health or happiness which is
the determining factor, but the fact of the invasion of the constitu-
tional right to privacy.
Just as the employer in General American could not consign to the
polygraph his supervisory responsibilities, 91 so management should
not surrender to the polygraph its responsibilities in pre-employment
screening.
3. Statutory Restrictions on the Use of the Polygraph
The response of state legislatures to polygraphy has taken two
forms. Twelve states have made the use of the polygraph in the em-
ployment context illegal.9 2 Eleven states have chosen to regulate poly-
graph operators through comprehensive licensing statutes. 93
The prohibitory statutes generally provide that "no employer," or
"no person (or through an agent)," or "no individual, corporation,
partnership, firm, or association," shall employ the "polygraph," "lie
detector" or "similar device" during hiring procedures.9 4 The general
91. Id.at 364.
92. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1964); CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.2 (1953); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-5Ig (1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (1953); HAWAII REV. LAWS §
378-21 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19B
(1963); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:170-90.1 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § § 659.225, .990
(1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4666.1 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.1-1, -2
(1964); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.120 (1965).
93. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-2201 to -2225 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.40-.56
(1967); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-5001 to -5016 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 202-1 to
-30 (Smith-Hurd 1963); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 329.010-.990 (1962); MISS. CODE ANN. §§
39.8920-61 to -84 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 648.005-.210 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
67-31-4 to -14 (1963); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-31-01 to -17 (1965); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
art. 2615F-3, §§ 1-30 (1969); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-729.01-.018 (1968).
94. The prohibiting statutes respectively prohibit the use of the polygraph in the
employment context by providing that "no employer" (California, Hawaii, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey), or "no person or agent" (Alaska, Oregon, and Pennsyl-
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prohibition is usually against "requiring or demanding," or even "re-
questing or suggesting," submission to polygraph testing by an "em-
ployee" or a "prospective employee" as a "condition for employment"
or as "a condition for continued employment." 95 No state statute ex-
plicitly prohibits the utilization of polygraph results submitted to the
employer where he has in no way suggested or discussed such testing
with an employee or prospective employee. 96 However, proof of vol-
untary submission would seem so burdensome as to effectively pro-
hibit tests. Moreover, those states prohibiting the "requesting or sug-
gesting" of polygraph testing have placed a substantial burden of
proof on any employer who utilizes polygraph test results over the
protests of an employee or prospective employee. On the other hand,
language merely prohibiting "requiring or demanding" submission to
testing permits an employer to utilize "voluntary" tests.
Several of the prohibitory statutes specifically exempt local, state,
and federal governmental agencies from coverage; other statutes spe-
cifically include governmental agencies. 97 A few of the statutes exempt
vania). or "no individual, corporation, partnership, firm or association" (Delaware.
Washington, and Connecticut, which also prohibits any "employment agency-) "shall
use the polygraph" (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania), "or lie detector" (Alaska, California, Delaware, Maryland, Nlassachu-
setts, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island. and Washington), "or similar
device" (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, and Washington) "in the em-
ployment context."
95. The respective statutes prohibit by the somewhat limiting language, "requiring
or demanding" (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington), or the more inclu-
sive language, prohibiting the "requesting or suggesting" of submission to polygraph
testing (Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, and New Jersey).
The prohibitions in some states specify that "no employee" is to be subjected to such
testing, while others refer to "prospective employees" as well. Included in the former
group are Hawaii, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, in the latter are Alaska, California. Con-
necticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington.
Submission to polygraph testing cannot be made a "condition for employment" in
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon.
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington. Submission cannot be madea "condition
for continued employment" in California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland.
New Jersey. Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington.
96. The Attorney General of California has interpreted the California statute, pro-
hibiting an employer from demanding or requiring polygraph tests of a person as a con-
dition of employment or continued employment, not to prohibit the employer from
requesting or permitting such tests. 43 OP. CAl. ATT'Y GEN. 25 (1964).
97. The respective states exempting "local" governmental agencies are California,
Connecticut, and Maryland; those exempting "state" governmental agencies are Cali-
fornia, Connecticut and Maryland. California and Maryland extend their exemptions to
"federal" agencies. Other states specifically apply their prohibitions to governmental
agencies. (Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, and Washington).
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from protection policemen, persons who are entrusted with drugs, and
persons involved with national security.98 A special exemption is
granted in a few states to "tests administered by law enforcement
agencies in the performance of their official duties." 99
While most states merely prohibit the use of the described test in
the employment context, some have made such use a misdemeanor. 100
Many of the prohibitory states have established penalties including a
fine or imprisonment or both. 10' It is of course possible that in those
states prohibiting required submission to polygraph testing a court
might infer a legislative intent to create civil liability on the part of an
employer to an employee or prospective employee in any case where
testing was used. Even though actual damages in such a case would
probably be speculative, a court might award punitive or general
damages as well. It is true, however, that there are no reported cases
imposing such civil liability.
The only readily available legislative history of any of these statutes
is that of California.10 2 The California legislature found that the in-
creasing use of lie detectors by personnel departments created sus-
pense and distrust between employers and employees, that such instru-
98. Policemen are specially exempted in some states; they are Alaska, Connecticut
(except for civilian employees of police departments), Pennsylvania, and Washington.
Nebraska, oddly enough, has enacted specific legislation requiring all sheriff employees
to submit to polygraph testing. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1737 (1969).
Also exempted in some states are persons entrusted with drugs; these states are Penn-
sylvania and Washington. Persons involved with national security are exempt in Wash-
ington.
99. These states are Delaware, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island.
100. Those states making a violation of the prohibition on polygraph testing a "mis-
demeanor" include Alaska, California, Maryland, and Washington. Such an act is
deemed "disorderly" in New Jersey.
101. Those states limiting penalties for violation of the prohibitory statutes to a fine
include Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-51g(d) (1967) (not less than $250 nor more than $1000 for each violation);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 100 § 95(c) (1966) (not to exceed $100); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
149, § 19B (1963) (not more than $200); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28.6.1-2 (1964) (not
more than $200).
Those providing penalties including "imprisonment" or "fine or imprisonment, or
both" include Alaska, California, Delaware, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. See ALASKA
STAT. § 23.10.037 (1964) (fine of not more than $1000, or by imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both); CAL. LABOR CODE § 23 (1953) (fine up to $500, up to six months
imprisonment, or both); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(c) (1953) (fined not more than
$500 or imprisoned not more than 90 days, or both); ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.990(7)
(1963) (fined not more than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 18.4666(l) (1969) (fine not to exceed $500 or by impris-
onment not exceeding one year, or both).
102. Review of 1963 Code Legislation, 38 CALIF. ST. B.J. 734 (1963).
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ments were not accurate, and that their use by inexperienced persons
resulted in false findings. 103 Rather than enacting a regulatory or li-
censing scheme, the California legislature prohibited employers from
requiring employees or job applicants to take lie detector tests as a
condition of employment and provided criminal penalties for viola-
tions. It was the view of the draftsmen that an employee discharged
for refusal to submit to such a test might also have an action for
breach of contract. 10 4 It is unlikely, however, that a job applicant, re-
jected because he refused to take a lie detector test, has a similar
cause of action under the California statute. 105
The eleven states following the regulatory approach have adopted
comprehensive acts entitled either "The Polygraph Examiners Act" or
"The Detection of Deception Examiners Act," except that Nevada has
chosen to integrate its regulation of polygraph examiners with existing
regulation of private investigators, private patrolmen, process servers
and repossessers.10 6 The obvious intention of these legislatures was to
assure the reliability of the polygraph tests administered in their states
by limiting the right to administer polygraph tests to those who are
capable, trained, and honest.10 7
103. Id. at 733. See California Governor Release No. 585 (July 19. 1963).
104. Review of'1963 Code Legislahion, .supra note 102, at 733.
105. Id.
106. Those states which have adopted an act entitled "The Polygraph Examiners
Act" include Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, New Mexico, Texas, and Virginia. Those
which have adopted the "Detection of Deception Examiners Act" include Florida, Illi-
nois, Kentucky, and North Dakota. The Nevada prohibition appears in a chapter
which includes other nonofficial law enforcement officers.
107. The qualifications for licensing as an examiner include: having reached the age
of twenty-one in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada
(Nevada also has a six month residency requirement), New Mexico (minimum age is
25), Texas, and Virginia. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2207() (1967); FLA. STAT. §
493.43(1) (1967): GA. CODE ANN. § 84-5-7(a) (1968): ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §
202-11(A) (Smith-Hurd 1963); Ky. REV. STAT. § 329.030(2) (1962); Miss. CODE ANN. §
32.8920-67(l) (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 648.110(l),(2) (1968); N.D. CENT. CODE §
43-31-07(6) (1965); N.M. SIM-. ANN. § 67-31-8(A) (1963); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. art.
2615F-3, § (8)(1) (1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-729.03 (b)(2) (1968). For an inclusive
compilation of the statutory citations of polygraph licensing states, as well as the states
which regulate polygraph testing per se, see also notes 92-93. supra.
Other qualifications for a polygraph examiner's license are: United States citizenship.
moral fitness, lack of any criminal conviction involving a crime of moral turpitude (in-
cluding in some states a dishonorable discharge), a college degree, or prescribed exam-
iner experience, graduation from an approved polygraph course, and a minimum of six
months internship (although the internship is usually extended to twelve months where
there has been no required enrollment in an approved training course), the achievement
of a passing grade on an examination administered in conformity with statutory re-
quirements, and the posting of a surety bond. Not all the states which license polygraph
100
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The comprehensive statutes are essentially licensing acts, and
provide a regulatory board for the certification of polygraph operators
and for the termination of their licenses. They provide for issuance of
a polygrapher's license after fulfillment of prescribed conditions, and
several require periodic renewal. 108 Most statutes provide for suspen-
sion or revocation of a license for misconduct related to the con-
ducting of polygraph examinations, while some merely permit injunc-
tions against continued performance where evidence is presented that
an operator has acted in violation of the regulatory statute. 109 Several
states further provide criminal penalties for such violations of the
statute as misrepresentation that one is a licensed polygraph examiner."10
All of the comprehensive acts require the polygraph examiner to
use an instrument which records visually, permanently, and simultane-
ously the subject's cardiovascular pattern and respiratory pattern, and
which permits the operator to record any other physiological changes
of his choosing."' Several of the acts require the examiner, upon re-
quest of the person examined, to inform him of the test results within
a given period of time after the request is made."12
It is clear that the main concern of the states regulating polygraph
examinations and prescribing operator's qualifications is with the reli-
ability of the polygraph examination. While the regulatory statutes
reduce unreliability by insuring a competent operator, this approach
examiners have the same qualifications, but all do have some combination of the above
requirements. Generally the statutes are summarized in notes 92-93, supra, and supra
this note.
108. The following states have statutes which provide for the issuance of a polygra-
pher's license: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, and Virginia require "peri-
odic renewal." See statutes cited in notes 92, 93, and 107, supra.
109. Those states providing for suspension or revocation of a license for conviction
of any criminal conduct involving moral turpitude, including fraud or misconduct re-
lated to the conducting of polygraph examinations, are: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illi-
nois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, and Virginia.
Those providing for the enjoining of examinations by an operator who has acted in vio-
lation of the regulatory statute include Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Texas,
and Virginia. See notes 92-93, supra.
110. Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Texas, and Virginia so provide.
11. The comprehensive acts are part of the sections of the state statutes cited in
notes 92, 93, and 107, supra. The New Mexico statute permits galvanic skin resistance
and/or reflex recordation.




does not improve the inherent nature of the instrument, the reliability
of which has not yet been established. Moreover, the very real com-
promise of the dignity and privacy of the employee or prospective
employee is not remedied by ensuring the competency of the exam-
iner. Workers can be protected from this invasion of privacy only by
prohibitory legislation explicitly forbidding all job-related polygraphy.
Only in this way can employees be realistically protected from pres-
sure to submit to polygraphing. The legislation should specifically
impose civil liability on the employer for using such tests. This would
provide protection to the prospective employee and an incentive to
take action beneficial to others as well. Punitive damages are a more
effective deterrent than criminal sanctions where, as here, both prose-
cutor and jury may believe criminal penalties are inappropriate.' 1 3
II. PERSONALITY TESTING
A. Test Instruments
The development of psychological testing was spurred by two nine-
teenth century concerns: first, the humane treatment of the feeble-
minded and the insane, 14 and second, the differentiation of personal
characteristics for the purpose of developing a system of human classi-
fication.115 James McKeen Cattell, an American psychologist, first
used the term "mental test" in describing a series of tests experimen-
113. For a discussion of proposed federal legislation which would prohibit the use of
polygraph testing on federal government employees and job applicants see text accom-
panying notes 3 14-21, infra.
114. The establishment of mental institutions created a need to be able to distin-
guish the insane from the feebleminded. A French physician, Esquirol, developed cri-
teria for making this distinction and created a scale for measuring feeblemindedness
based on the subject's use of language. See J. EsQUIROL, DES MALADIES MENTALES
CONSIDEREES SOUS LES RAPPORTS MEDICAL, HYGENIQUE, ET MEDICO-LEGAL 340 (1938).
For a detailed account of the early days of psychological testing see F. GOODENOUGH.
IEN-IAL TESTING: I Ls HISTORY, PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS (1949), and J. PETERSON.
EARLY CONCEPTIONS OF TESTS OF INTELLIGENCE (1926).
115. Francis Galton, the English biologist, fostered modern testing by his interest in
developing a system of human classification. Galton focused on the measurement of
physical traits through the use of tests of vision, hearing, muscular strength, reaction
time, and other sensorimotor functions. Galton's premise was that tests of sensory dis-
crimination could serve as a measure of a person's intellect, and therefore, the greater
the sensory discriminative capacity the greater the intelligence. See F. GALTON.
INQUIRIES INTo HUMAN FACUI TY AND I'is DEVELOPMENT 27-29 (1883).
102
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tally administered to college students to determine intellectual ability.1 16
Another American psychologist, Stella Sharp, first included the
measurement of verbal and mathematical skills in the "mental test;"
later Sharp proposed methods for measuring more complex psycho-
logical functions by the inclusion of tests of reading, verbal associa-
tion, and simple arithmetic. 17 The heavy reliance on physiological
measures of motor skills in early tests came under criticism in 1895 by
Binet and Henri, who proposed measurements of such various func-
tions as memory, imagination, attention, comprehension, suggestibil-
ity, and aesthetic appreciation on the premise that direct measurement
of complex intellectual functions was the best approach to psycholog-
ical testing. 118 The first large battery of group psychological tests was
developed during World War I for the United States Army to assist in
the classification of recruits. Labeled the Army Alpha Examination,
the test was administered to over one million servicemen. 1 9 This test
was considered a successtkul solution to the problem of finding a
method of measuring the potential abilities of military personnel.
During World War II, development of "screening tests" continued in
the form of such instruments as the Army General Classification Test.
The availability to private industry of the test instrument and experi-
ence of the War Department resulted in widespread use and accept-
ance of psychological testing. 12
0
116. Cattell, Mental Tests and Measurements, 15 MIND 373-80 (1890). Cattell
shared Galton's view that intellect could be measured by tests of sensory discrimination
and reaction time.
117. Sharp, Individual Psychology: A Study in Psychological Method, 10 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 329-91 (1899).
118. Binet & Henri, La Psychologie Individuelle, 2 ANNIE PSYCHOLOGIE 411-63
(1895). In 1905 Binet and Simon published a test for the measurement of the intellectual
ability of students. Although sensory and perception tests were included, the examina-
tion consisted mainly of verbal testing. See Binet & Simon, Methods Nouvelles pour
le Diagnostic du Niveau Intellectuel des Anormaux, 11 ANNEE PSYCHOLOGIE 191-244
(1905). The Binet scale went through three revisions, but the major modification was
performed by L. M. Terman of Stanford University. This resulted in the Stanford-
Binet test (a ratio between mental age and chronological age). See L. TERMAN, THE
MEASUREMENT OF INTELLIGENCE (1961). The Binet tests are administered to one per-
son at a time; some of these examinations require oral responses which are individ-
ually timed.
119. CENTER FOR LABOR AND MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 2 (G. Hagglund & D. Thompson ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Hagglund & Thompson].
120. Guilford & Lacey, Printed Classification Tests, in ARMY AIR FORCES,
AVIATION PSYCHOLOGY PROGRAM RESEARCH REPORT ch. 23 (1947).
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Personality testing, a distinct subgroup of psychological testing,
measures emotional adjustment, social relations, motivation and inter-
ests. The earliest personality assessments utilized free association tests, 12 1
situational tests, 122 and other projective tests.' 23 Most contempo-
rary personality tests may be classified as either inventory instruments
(objective tests) or projective tests. Perhaps the most widely utilized
inventory measures are those which provide information on the degree
of interest in various activities, primarily those of an occupational
nature. A second category of inventory measures are tests which yield
scores on several personality characteristics. 124 Most inventory instru-
ments are administered on a group basis and scored objectively. A
major criticism of these examinations is that they can be faked by
sophisticated subjects, for there is a strong motivation to give socially
acceptable answers. These self-report devices reveal how a person de-
sires others to think he will behave; they do not necessarily project
actual performance. Nevertheless, these examinations have seen consi-
derable use in employment situations, and several studies reveal ade-
quate validities for managerial selection. 125 Other studies reveal that
personality inventories have had a rather limited success in predicting
employees' performance on the job. 126 In the projective personality
121. Kraepelin. a European psychologist, prepared a series of tests of the basic fac-
tors of individual character in order to classify his psychiatric patients. Kraepelin used
"'free association tests" in which the subject was given specially-selected stimulus words
and was required to respond to each with the first word that came to mind. See E.
KRALPEI IN, UBER DIE BEEINFI USSUNG EINFA('HER PSYCHISCHER VORGANGE DURCH EINIGE
ARZNEINIII lIE (1892).
122. The first situational tests were developed by Hartshorne, NMay and Mailer in
the 1920's to measure the attitudes of school children toward such behavior as cheating.
lying, cooperativeness, and persistence. Situational tests measure skill in solving prob-
lems which are disguised as everyday situations. See H. HARTSHORNE, NI. MAY & J.
NlAI I ER, S I UDIES IN SERVICE AND SELF-CONTROL (1929).
123. The 1920's saw the development of a projective test technique first used by
Hermen Rorschach which consisted of ink blots which the subject was asked to describe.
The assumption underlying this method is that the individual will "'project" his character
traits through his responses. See H. RORSCIHACH. PSYCHODIAGNOSTICS: A DIAGNOSTIC TIST
BASED ON PERCEPIION (Eng. ed. P. Lemkau & B. Kronenburg transl. 1941).
124. Interest inventories are exemplified by: the Strong Vocational Interest Blank
and the Kuder Preference Record-Vocational. Personality inventories include: the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Bernreuter Personality Inventory. Guil-
ford Zimmerman Temperament Survey, California Psychological Inventory. Activity
Vector Analysis, Thurstone Temperament Schedule. Gordon Personal Profile and Per-
sonal Preference Schedule, and the Study of Values.
125. Guion & Gottier, Validity of PersonalityN Measures in Personnel Selection, 18
PERSONNEL PSYCHOI OGY 135-64 (1965) 1hereinafter cited as Guion & Gottier].
126. See, e.g., L. CRONBACII. ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAi TESTING 485 (2d ed.
1965).
104
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test, on the other hand, the subject is asked to interpret standard stim-
ulus situations which are constructed so that the uninformed person
cannot determine what is being measured. Theoretically the number
of responses which various people can give to a single stimulus situa-
tion is infinite. The projective approach, in conquering the problem of
subject anticipation of desired response, introduces the new problem
of interpreting the responses.' 27
One well known example of the vocational interest inventory,
widely used in employee counseling, is the Kuder Preference Record
Vocational Test.' 28 The major difficulty with this type of examination
is that an applicant for a job can, and often does, make his choices in
accordance with what he feels is expected for the desired position,
rather than on the basis of his real feelings. A second difficulty is that
these inventories sample appreciation and interest rather than experi-
ence. Studies have revealed that the Kuder test is often unsuccessful
when used to select people for inital hiring or promotion. The correla-
tions between supervisors' scores and managerial performance have
not proved satisfactory in any significant number of studies. 29
The category of inventory measure of personality characteristics is
exemplified by the widely used Minnesota Multiphasic Personality In-
ventory (MMPI). 30 This personality inventory includes questions
127. The best known projective test instruments include: the Rorschach Test, the
Thematic Appreciation Test, the Rosenzweig Picture-Frustration Study, the Tomkins-
Horn Picture Arrangement Test, and the Washington Personal History.
128. The Kuder Preference Record consists'of 168 items. The subject's responses
are totaled to obtain the various area scores. The ten regular scores obtained from the
test include the following interest areas: outdoor, mechanical, computational, scientific,
literary, musical, social science, clerical, and supervisory. Examples of occupations that
are considered to be included within "mechanical" are civil engineer, surgeon, in-
dustrial designer, fireman, and stonemason; and within "persuasive" are thought to be
advertising manager, clergyman, psychiatrist, lawyer, receptionist, and retail merchant.
G. KUDER, MANUAL FOR THE KUDER PREFERENCE RECORD (1943).
129. See, e.g., Miner, The Kuder Preference Record in Management Appraisal, 13
PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 191-92 (1960).
130. In the MMPI items are classified into 26 categories as follows: general health;
general neurological; cranial nerves; motility and coordination; sensibility; vasomotor;
trophic; speech and secretory; cardio-respiratory; gastrointestinal; genitourinary; hab-
its, family and marital; occupational, educational, sexual attitudes; religious attitudes;
political attitudes and law and order; social attitudes; affect-depressive, affect-manic;
obsessive and compulsive; delusions, hallucinations and illusions; phobias; sadism and
masochism; morale; masculinity and feminity; and presentation of self. The directions
to the subject read in part:
In this inventory you are asked for information about your feelings, your likes and
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on attitudes towards morals, sex, religion and family.131 The major
criticisms of this test from a psychiatric viewpoint include: the mis-
leading psychiatric labels used in the diagnostic scales; the unreliabil-
ity of some scales; the limitations in normative samples (700 Minne-
apolis adults were tested in the original standardization); and the
cultural and subcultural differences influencing interpretation and
attitudes toward the test itself.132
The second major form of contemporary personality tests, the
projective test, is illustrated by the Rorschach ink blot test.133 The
Rorschach contains ten cards: five include a single ink blot in black,
dislikes, and a great many other things. This is not a test. There are no "right" an-
swers except the answers that tell the truth about yourself.
The responses to the questions are recorded in one of three categories: "true or mostly
true;- "not usually true, or entirely untrue;" and "cannot say." S. HATHAWAY & J.
rNIcKINLEY. MANUAL FOR THE MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY (1943).
131. The MMPI has stimulated a great deal of psychological research. One collec-
tion of articles examining the inventory includes 66 papers and a bibliography of 689
titles. G. WELSH & W. DAHLSTROM, BASIC READINGS ON THE MMPI IN PSYCHOLOGY AND
MEDICINE (1956).
132. The Congressional subcommittee which examined psychological testing
wrestled with the question of their validity as well as with their discriminatory effect
(particularly in the MMPI). The following exchange between Congressmen Rosen-
thal and Gallagher and Dr. Arthur Brayfield, Executive Officer of the American
Psychological Association, before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Government Operations is particularly instructive:
Mr. Rosenthal: All right. One of the important factors is this seeing which way the
person or youngster goes toward his male or his female characteristics. Fol-
lowing that psychological interest on the M.M.P.I. was a question "Who do you
think is more masculine, Washington or Lincoln?" Now, the subcommittee itself
has been wrestling with this for months.
Dr. Brayfield: This is why you were interested in the answer sheet wasn't it"
Mr. Rosenthal: Still we have never really resolved that. It seemed to me that not
only was there presumably an answer that Washington was associated more with
war and soldiers and that he was more masculine, but that certain groups would
tend to favor Lincoln with having no masculine tendencies, and this led me to
believe that there were many, many errors in this kind of testing and that this
compounded with the violation of an individual's constitutional rights permitted
me to feel that there was great doubt in the practical use of these tests.
Do you agree with me that maybe there is an intermixture of discrimination
against groups when you are simply trying to find out this masculine-feminine
tendencies?
Dr. Brayfield: You made it more specific.
Mr. Gallagher: Sonny Liston would say "Lincoln." He would get a minus on the
masculine-feminine scale. Now he would not exactly be considered feminine.
Mr. Rosenthal: As far as we know, that is.
Dr. Brayfield: As far as we know, that's right. . ..
Hearings on Special Inquiry on Invasion of Privacy Before a Sabcomm. of the House
Comnn. on Governnent Operations, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., at 334 [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings on Privacy].
133. H. RORSCHACI .supra note 123.
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white, and gray; two contain additional touches of bright red; and the
remaining three combine several pastel shades. If the examination is
individually given, the subject is asked to describe what he sees in the
blot, and all responses produced are recorded. After this initial free
response session, the subject is asked to review his responses and to
indicate his reasons for the particular description he applied to the
particular blot. Group administration of the test, asking for written
responses, is also possible. The infinite variety of descriptions made
possible by the ambiguous nature of the stimuli prevents the subject
from easily giving calculated responses, but analysis of the descrip-
tions is extremely difficult. 34 Rorschach testing, as with all projective
testing, reflects Gestalt psychology in its objective of a "global" de-
scription of the individual from the integration of fragmented re-
sponses and the interrelating of various scores.
The principal criticism of the Rorschach test has concerned the
scoring techniques. Studies of the standard and achromatic cards have
revealed that color has no effect on most of the response characteris-
tics attributed to it. 13 5 Moreover, there is substantial evidence that
verbal aptitude influences several Rorschach scores used as indicators
of personality traits. 36 Finally, the most compelling criticism is that
the Rorschach analysis varies significantly from one examiner to an-
other.137 The results of critical studies of the test suggest that the re-
sulting personality assessment is influenced by factors quite extraneous
134. See S. BECK, RORSCHACH'S TEST (3 Vols. 1945, 1949, 1952). The most
common scoring categories employed with the Rorschach include location, determi-
nents, and content. Location refers to the part of the blot with which the subject asso-
ciates each response (the whole blot, a common detail, or an unusual detail). The
determinents include form, color, shading, and "perceived" movement. For example,
human movement, animal movement, abstract or inanimate movement. Color and
shading are perceived as depth, texture, and as forms such as clouds. Content refers
to images perceived by the subject including human figures, parts of human figures,
animal figures, animal details and inanimate objects. Analysis of the Rorschach
responses is based upon the relative number of responses falling into the various
categories, as well as upon certain ratios and interrelationships among different
categories. Interpretative relationships include association of "whole" responses with
conceptual thinking, of "color" responses with emotionality, and of "human move-
ment" with imagination and fantasy.
135. Baughman, The Role of the Stimulus in Rorschach Responses, 55 Psy-
CHOLOGICAL BULL. 121-47 (1958).
136. See Lotsof, Intelligence, Verbal Fluency, and the Rorschach Test, 17 J.
CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 21-24 (1953).
137. See Baughman, Rorschach Scores as a Function of Examiner Difference,
15 J. PROJECTIVE TECHNOLOGY 243-49 (1951).
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to the personality variables allegedly measured by the Rorschach
test. 138
B. The Use and Criticism of Personality Testing in Employment
A 1964 study of firms employing two hundred or more workers
reported that seventy-seven percent had testing programs; of those
using tests, ninety-three percent were using some type of ability apti-
tude test, seventy-three percent were using intelligence tests, thirty-
nine percent were using personality tests, and thirty-one percent
were using personal interest tests.1 39 An earlier study indicates that the
larger a firm is, the more likely it is to utilize tests in selecting per-
sonnel. 140 Ninety percent of the firms test some or all prospective or
new employees, while only forty percent test current employees in
making internal decisions. 141 Employers justify their use of person-
ality tests on three grounds: they provide a scientific basis for efficient
personnel placement; they minimize risk of accidents and the place-
ment of incompatible workers, guaranteeing a measure of confidence
in current workers; and, finally, prospective employees are provided
an apparently objective process through which they may gain suitable
employment.
There are several objections to the use of personality testing in the
pre-employment context, involving the invalidity of the instrument,
interference with the subject's personal life, impermissible discrimina-
tion, and unfairness where a more complete assessment of his work
potential would result in his being hired. Evaluations of currently-
138. See e.g., R. SCHAFER, PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATION IN RORSCHACH
TESTING (1954).
139. National Industrial Conference Board, Personnel Practices in Factory and
Office: Alanifttcatring, in STUDIES IN PERSONNEL PO1ICY 15 (1964).
140. A 1960 study found that 34 percent of responding companies with less than
100 employees used tests in selecting personnel, while 60 percent of firms with more
than 1000 employees were using tests for this purpose. Ward, Putting Excctives to
the Test, 38 HARV. Bus. REV. 607 (1960).
141. J. CAMPBELL, M. DUNNETTE, E. LAVLER. & K. WELCH, MANAGERIAL
BEHAVIOR, PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 27 (1970). Companies which use tests
for personnel selection generally use an extensive battery of tests. While a few
companies use only ability tests, most use both ability and personality or interest
tests. Those companies using tests tend to use them more extensively at lower level
positions and at initial hiring rather than in promotional decisions. For managerial
promotion, the personal judgment of the employer or personnel officer is favored as
a superior method for selecting good executives.
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available personality measuring instruments, both objective inven-
tories and projective tests, suggest that these instruments are not
sufficiently sophisticated to obtain accurate predictions of employee
performance. Lee J. Cronbach, after reviewing a number of valida-
tion studies in connection with employee selection in the British Civil
Service, the Veterans Administration, and the Air Force, concluded
that evaluations made by those having psychological training were not
superior to those obtained from peer ratings; Cronbach went on to
observe that "structured group performance work example" tests have
a high validity for jobs requiring group acceptance. 142 Psychologists
Guion and Gottier, in a comprehensive analysis of published valida-
tion studies of both personality inventories and projective tests used
for employee selection, concluded that "it is difficult in the face of this
summary to advocate, with a clear conscience, the use of personality
measures in most situations as a basis for making employment deci-
sions about people."'1 43 The concern with validity was evidenced by
John W. Macy, Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commis-
sion, who reported to a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Government Operations in 1965 that the Civil Service Commission
does not use personality tests as such in any personnel decision. 44
142. L. CRONBACH, supra note 126, at 485, 589-90.
143. Guion & Gottier, supra note 125, at 135-64. Guion and Gottier analyzed
ninety-five validation studies on fifteen leading personality inventories, eleven valida-
tions on six projective tests, and eleven validation studies on three special inventories.
See also Barrett, Guide to Using Psychological Tests, 41 HARV. Bus. REV. 138-46
(1963).
144. House Hearings on Privacy, supra note 132, at 38. Macy suggested that the
basic objections to the use of personality tests as a criterion for employment selection
were that personality tests are designed for "clinical use, and are not to measure the spe-
cific characteristics needed by persons working in particular occupations," that these
tests are "subject to distortion, either purposefully or otherwise" so that "the scores are
undependable as a basis for employment decisions," that test results "can easily be
grossly misinterpreted and misapplied by persons who are not qualified as psychiatrists
or psychologists trained to interpret such test results in the light of their total study of the
individual." Macy went on to observe that the use of personality tests in the employ-
ment context "seriously jeopardize [s] privacy." Id. at 37-38.
Macy explained the nature of personality tests:
I understand your area of interest to be those tests and questionnaires which ask
the applicant to reveal personal information, such as his feelings, his likes and dis-
likes, his personal and social habits and the like.
Incidentally I see no basic distinction between "questionnaires" and "tests:" I
use the term "test" to cover the variety of so-called personality traits such as the
applicant's behavior toward other people in terms of, for example, aggressiveness
or anxiety. They generally yield scores which seek to show the degree to which the




Senator Sam J. Ervin, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, observed at the outset of the Senate Hearings
on the use of psychological tests by the federal government that the
question of the test instruments' validity could pose serious legal ques-
tions where the tests were used in the employment context: 1 45
[T] he charge has been made that aside from the invasion of privacy,
the procedures surrounding the testing, the composition of the tests
themselves, and the use made of the test results, present serious due
process questions. Competent experts in the field have questioned the
validity of the tests being used by government as reasonable services
for carrying out the mandates of Congress in the personnel field. They
have raised questions concerning the validity, reliability, and accuracy
of some of these tests as methods for determining the fitness and suit-
ability of applicants or employees for jobs.
A fundamental criticism of personality testing, therefore, is the va-
lidity of the measurements. As Karl U. Smith of the University of
Wisconsin argued to the Senate Subcommittee: "The field of person-
ality testing is a hodgepodge of imprecise psychopathological termi-
nology, of limited and biased procedures, and of poorly constructed
test situations, designed to probe social non-conformity. ' '146
Nevertheless, even assuming that the tests were absolutely infallible
in predicting behavior, the use of personality tests as screening devices
is subject to attack. Mr. Martin L. Gross, author of the book The
Brain Watchers, 1 47 told the House Subcommittee:1 48
145. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 1-2.
146. Id. at 123. Smith indicts personality testing not merely because of its lack of
validity, but primarily because those using such tests create the false appearance of un-
biased scientific neutrality in decision making:
Personality testing is useful to industry not because it is scientifically valid [and]
not because it represents enlightened human relations procedures. All of our ex-
periences with personality tests in industry indicate that industries are interested
only in quicker procedure of looking at people.... The reason why industry is inter-
ested in these procedures, we believe, is that the management of the large industries
have found in clinical psychology and its testing procedures, perhaps unwittingly.
various techniques to crystallize and strengthen management authority over indi-
vidual workers and unions. The personality testing situation has provided the
means for industrial management to achieve some quasi-medical authority over
workers who are individualistic and assertive in social adjustment. The test can be
used as an established prestige symbol or scientific device to define the social cli-
mate of the industry, to suggest and demonstrate conformity principles and
methods of obtaining conformity and to induce loyalty and affiliation.
147. See M. GROSS, THE BRAIN WATCHERS (1962).
148. House Hearings on Privacy, supra note 132, at 79.
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I would oppose them completely on moral grounds in the invasion of
privacy, because they are the greatest possible invasion of privacy that
can be made. It is probable that the questions that are asked are more
intimate than those that a wiretapper would over hear in a normal busi-
ness conversation. In a normal business conversation, people do not
talk about religious attitudes and sex life.
Representative Cornelius Gallagher has argued that where the tests
are utilized by the government in its personnel or employment activi-
ties the invasion of privacy posed by personality testing is not only a
threat to individual liberty but a violation of constitutional protec-
tions. 49
A greal deal of the criticism based on invasion of privacy focuses
on the content of the questions employed in inventories, especially
questions dealing with religion, sex, and family background, as well as
personal habits and interests. Some criticism has been directed at the
collection of personality assessments of individuals, their possible
availability to others than the immediate tester, and the lack of any-
thing like the "doctor-patient privilege" which is available where tests
and test results are utilized by psychiatrists. The accumulation of test
records, the compilation of dossiers, and the widespread availability
of test results where computer data recovery is possible increases the
potential danger of personality testing to the individual. 150
One argument proffered as a defense to the use of personality in-
struments is that the subject "consents" to the invasion of privacy by
consenting to take the examination. Professor Monroe Freedman has
149. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 534. In the hearings Congressman
Gallagher summarized his argument that personality testing used by government in
its employment activity was wrong:
The American people would rise in great protest if the United States conducted a
physical search of the homes of public employees as a condition of employment.
... I do not think anyone would argue that we might find a lot of undesireables
working for the government if such steps were taken. Yet the Federal Govern-
ment has been engaged in a much more insidious type of search. . . . It has been
searching the minds of Federal employees and job applicants through personality
testing. . . . [T] he means in my view, violates the 1st, 5th, 9th, and 14th amend-
ments. ...
150. House Hearings on Privacy, supra note 132, at 348. Professor Monroe
Freedman of George Washington University reflected such concern in his testimony at
the privacy hearings; after observing that the computer makes it possible to analyze
great quantities of data and to compile personnel dossiers he concluded:
The ready availability of psychological tests of tens of thousands of our citizens is,
therefore, not the least frightening aspect of modern technology on the relationship
between State and citizen.
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argued that such consent was void on two counts: " [t] he job appli-
cant who wants the job is not truly a free agent;" and "[t] he consent
is meaningless unless the examinee knows what he is consenting to."' --t
This latter objection certainly is true where, as often is the case,
the subject does not have an opportunity to preview the examination.
Moreover, as Professor Freedman rightly points out, the subject "may
know the questions, but he does not know the answers, the purpose
for eliciting the answers, or the inferences that may be drawn . . .
nor does he know the significance of the inference once he has been
plotted to such a scale."1 52
A second attack on the use of personality testing is that current
practices involve a "denial of equal protection." The tests are used
only on lower strata personnel, while executives and high level offi-
cials are not subjected to the "indignity" of such testing because of
anticipated resentment on the part of such individuals. 153
A related objection to many of the current test instruments is that
they discriminate against individuals on the basis of cultural and so-
cial experience. Where this involves race or sex discrimination the
objection is significant as it reveals a clear denial of due process and
equal protection. Likewise, it is conceded that there is a socioeco-
nomic bias in many of these test instruments which results from the
basic reference group which was utilized in establishing the norm. 154
A further criticism of personality testing is its influence in estab-
151. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 173-74.
152. Id. at 174. In these same hearings Congressman Gallagher also rejected the
notion that consent vitiated the invasion of privacy:
Remember there was nothing voluntary about these tests when the special inquiry
of the House Government Operations Committee started its investigation. Persons
could not select their own private psychologists and doctors to conduct and eval-
uate the tests. Government employees and job applicants are far from the coopera-
tive subjects that even the test publishers admit are necessary to make the test re-
suits of any real value. They often resent the questions and admit quite freely that
their answers were those they thought would get them the job or promotion.
hi. (t 536.
153. Id. at 212-13. Professor Freedman reflected on this discriminatory use of per-
sonality assessments in his statement to the subcommittee:
We might further observe that it is somewhat presumptuous to suggest that only
some Government employees are of such vital importance to the national interest
to warrant psychological testing. . . . What is the logic that excludes the Presi-
dent's Cabinet from questionings so vital to national welfare? ... If the tests are all
we are assured they are, surely not a single public official should be immune.
Id. at 174.
154. See testimony of W. Grant Dahlstrom, id. at 258.
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lishing conformity among employees by selecting an identifiable and
single type of worker 155 and, through the influence of test measures,
compelling uniform conduct. 15 6
The lack of access to test results and the inability of the subject to
refute the determinations of the personnel officer or psychologist are
arguably denials of due process. Senator Ervin made this argument in
his opening statement as Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee:
".. . if the employee has a right to confront his accusers in some
proceedings, then perhaps he should confront the psychological tests
and the psychiatric reports which may cast a cloud over his emotional
stability and his mental competency.' 57
Early in the Senate hearings, Dr. Arthur Brayfield, Executive Of-
ficer of the American Psychological Association, while arguing the
validity of the test instruments, conceded that the criticisms discussed
above were the concerns of the citizen and the legal system and could
not necessarily be abandoned to the professional test examiners them-
selves:' 58
The general topic of invasion of privacy is one in which our psycholo-
gists have an interest. As our ethical code makes clear, we certainly do
not wish to see psychological instruments used carelessly or unjustly
against the privacy to which a human being is morally and legally enti-
tled. However, psychologists are not competent to make a final judg-
ment whether a given personnel procedure is constitutional or not.
Martin 0. Gross summarized the criticism of personality testing as a
screening device in the employment context, suggesting that the inter-
155. Congressman Gallagher referred to this first concern when he observed that
"The eccentrics, for example, who often bring great creativity and drive to their work,
were eliminated, I fear, because they raised doubts in the minds of personnel officers."
Id. at 534.
156. Professor Freedman raised the second concern by his description of the "feed-
back effect" of testing whereby individuals conduct themselves in conformity with the
standards which the test instruments appear to consider desireable. For instance, in
answering the question, "What magazines are read in your household?" which appears
on one personality inventory, people might, in Professor Freedman's estimation
start being concerned about whether it is better for their children's benefit in
their academic careers that they get U.S. News and World Report around the
house instead of Nation, or the New Republic instead of National Review. And in
that way there is a degree of political control that is highly undesireable.
House Hearings on Privacy, supra note 132, at 356.
157. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 3.
158. Id. at 68.
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view and the probationary period were sufficient and satisfactory de-
vices for employment decisions: 159
The old-fashioned method of interviews, checking references and
making personal decisions seems to hold up better than anything else.
I think the problem is that we Americans tend to be a little mechanical
minded. We are looking for a computer. A shortcut that says that "X"
is the proper cutoff score that will make the human being easily man-
ipulated. This is one of our bad traits, and we should get over it. In-
stead we should sharpen our ability to personally evaluate people.
This cannot be done by psychologists asking questions off the top of
their heads. It can be done by bringing a little personal wisdom to
selection and evaluation.
C. The Legal Status of Personality Testing
1. Statutory and Administrative Provisions Regulating Personality
Testing
(a) Federal Statutes and Administrative Regulations. The Presi-
dent is vested with authority under article II of the Constitution to
control the appointment and removal of officers of the executive de-
partment.' 60 Further, he is authorized by statute to prescribe regula-
tions for admission to the Civil Service1 61 and is directed with the aid
of the Civil Service Commission to develop and utilize competitive
examinations to test the fitness of applicants for public service.' 6 2 The
Civil Service Commission is vested with responsibility for regulating
and controlling such examinations and records thereof.'6 3
The use of personality testing by federal agencies is widespread,1 64
159. Id. at 43-44.
160. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
161. Civil Service Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964).
162. Id. §633(2)(1), providing that:
Such examinations shall be practical in their character, and so far as may be shall
relate to those matters which fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the per-
sons examined to discharge the duties of the service into which they seek to be ap-
pointed.
163. Id. § 633(3).
164. John W. Macy. Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, made public the
policy of the Commission with regard to the use of personality tests:
The Commission does not itself use and prohibits agencies from using personality
tests as such in any personal action affecting employees or position in the competi-
tive service. This does not, of course, relate to the proper use of such tests by a
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especially in those agencies which engage in security-related activities. 165
The principal concern of the Executive department is that the test
instruments do not discriminate against the individual on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" as prohibited by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.166 This concern is not limited to the situa-
tion where the prospective employee is actually employed by the gov-
ernment, but extends to those situations where an individual is en-
gaged either by an employer operating under a government contract,167
or by any employer "engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has twenty-five or more employees for each working day in each
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
qualified psychiatrist or psychologist when, in his professional judgment, they
would assist in his total study of an individual in connection with medical determi-
nations for employment or fitness for duty.
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 202. This policy statement must, however, be
viewed in relation to the general finding of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the widespread use of personality testing by government agencies. Hearings on
Privacy and the Rights of Federal Employees Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966) [hereinafter
cited as 1966 Senate Hearings]. Senator Ervin summed up the Subcommittee's findings
with respect to the use of personality testing in his opening statement during the 1966
Senate Hearings:
We were told at our hearings last year that the Civil Service Commission banned
all personality testing except that done under medical direction, which is precisely
how much of the testing was being done. In addition, this ruling only applied as far
as the Commission's jurisdiction ran. The State Department told us they halted the
use of one personality test although they were apparently using six or seven. The
Peace Corps told us they were dropping the offensive questions on one of the tests
they used. Yet, when they sent me a copy of the revised test last March, we found
that they ask volunteers such things as these, and they are set out so that the
answers are true or false:
17. My father was a good man.
18. I am very seldom troubled by constipation.
20. My sex life is satisfactory.
27. Evil spirits possess me at times.
30. At times I feel like swearing.
These are questions from psychological tests that apparently are still employed by
Government agencies.
Id. at 5-6.
165. See Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953), as amended, Exec.
Order No. 10491, 18 Fed. Reg. 6583 (1953); Exec. Order No. 10531, 19 Fed. Reg.
3069 (1954); Exec. Order No. 10548, 19 Fed. Reg. 4871 (1954); Exec. Order No.
10550, 19 Fed. Reg. 4981 (1954). These executive orders are the government's claim
of authority for exemption of "security related" personnel from the protection of its
anti-polygraph policy. The government apparently feels that those who are privy to
its innermost secrets should be scrutinized more closely.
166. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, §701(b), 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
167. This concern is evidenced by Department of Labor regulations for validation of
employment tests of government contractors and subcontractors. 33 Fed. Reg.
115
Washington Law Review Vol. 47: 73, 1971
year."' 68 Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevents the
latter class of employers from utilizing test instruments which in fact
discriminate against prospective employees on the prohibited bases.' 69
Non-discriminatory testing is clearly exempted. 170 It is clear, then,
that psychological testing by those employers covered by the Act is
not per se forbidden. Nevertheless, it may be the case that personality
testing, as a consequence of the validating groups utilized in test prep-
aration, may be by its very nature discriminatory and thereby pro-
scribed in certain cases under the 1964 Act.
The recent unanimous decision by the United States Supreme Court
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 1 71 provides authority for a broad reading
of the prohibitory language of section 703. The employer in Griggs
had required the employee, as a condition of employment or transfer
to other jobs in the company, to hold a high school diploma and to
obtain satisfactory scores on two professionally prepared aptitude
tests: the Wonderlic Personnel Test, which purports to measure gen-
eral intelligence, and the Bennet Mechanical Aptitude Test. Neither
test was directed at the measurement of ability to perform any partic-
ular job or category of jobs. While the employer had, previous to the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act, discriminated in its employment
14392-94 (1968). While acknowledging that properly validated and standardized tests
can provide an "objective basis for employment," the regulations reveal concern that
certain test instruments which appear fair on their faces can result in discrimina-
tion as they are used in specific cases:
It has become clear that in many instances contractors are using tests to determine
qualifications for hire, transfer, or promotion without evidence that they are valid
indicies of performance potential. Where evidence in support of presumed rela-
tionships between test performance and job behavior is lacking the possibility of
discrimination in the application of test results must be recognized.
Id. § I(f). To eliminate such discrimination each contracting agency must require each
contractor to have available "evidence that the tests are valid for the intended purpose."
Id. § 2(a). Evidence of a test's validity is to "consist of empirical data demonstrating
that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work
behavior comprising or relevant to the jobs for which candidates are being evaluated."
Id. §2(b).
168. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, §701(b), 18 U.S.C. §241 (1964).
169. Id. §§ 703(a)(i)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(a)-(2).
170. Id. § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Therein it is made clear that the intended
limitation is of testing which results in the forbidden discrimination, and not of testing
generally:
nor shall it be an unlawful practice for an employer to give and to act upon
the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to dis-
criminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
171. 401 U.S. 424(1971).
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practices, the analysis of the Court was not limited to a situation in-
volving prior discriminatory practices. The Court rejected the Court
of Appeals holding that since "there was no finding of a racial purpose
of invidious intent in the adoption of the high school diploma require-
ment or general intelligence test and that these standards had been
applied fairly to whites and Negroes alike,"'1 72 there was no violation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Court found that the objective of Title VII is "to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees
over other employees.' 73 A narrow reading of the holding of the
Court would limit it to the situation where there were prior discrim-
inatory practices on the part of the employer. However, a broader
reading of the case would prohibit the use of testing devices regardless
of the prior practices of the employer:' 74
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone
is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to ex-
clude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited.
The Court held that Congress placed on the employer the burden of
showing that any given requirement has a manifest relationship to the
employment in question: 175
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring proce-
dures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is
giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are
demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.
Applying this standard, the Court found that a satisfactory score on
the two tests utilized was not shown to be related to successful per-
formance of the jobs at issue.
172. Id. at 429.
173. Id. at 429-30.
174. Id. at 431.
175. Id. at 436. "What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must
measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract." Id. The Court based
its finding that any test must be "job-related" on the legislative history and the adminis-
trative regulations promulgated under the Act. The Senate discussion of section 703(h)
shows that the Act was not intended to go as far as a case reprinted in the Congressional
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The administrative regulations promulgated by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission clarify the Commission's view that
section 703(h) permits only job related tests:176
The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed
ability test" to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or
skills required by the particular job or class of jobs which the appli-
cant seeks, or which fairly affords the employer a chance to measure
the applicant's ability to perform a particular job or class of jobs. The
fact that a test was prepared by an individual or organization claiming
expertise in test preparation does not, without more, justify its use
within the meaning of Title VII.
The Court in Griggs suggested that the Commission findings should
be given great deference and concluded that the findings at issue were
supported by the language of the statute and the legislative history.
Moreover, the EEOC Guidelines ought to be regarded not only as
consistent with the intent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act but also as a
proper means of effecting the will of Congress in preventing appar-
ently objective tests from resulting in discrimination.
(b) State Statutes and Regulations. Most states have enacted legis-
Record where a hearing examiner from the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Com-
mission suggested that all standardized tests on which whites performed better than Ne-
groes were forbidden, no matter what the business justification. See 110 CONG. REC.
5662 (1964) [decision of hearing examiner in Myart v. Motorola Co.]. The order of the
hearing examiner included a direction that any tests utilized must include a compensa-
tory measure which would reflect social and educational deprivations:
if respondent chooses to replace test No. 10 (the test to which the plaintiff was
subjected), [respondent should] adopt a test which shall reflect and equate inequali-
ties and environmental factors among the disadvantaged and culturally deprived
groups.
Id. at 5664.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, reversing the finding of the Fair Employment Prac-
tices Commission, held that an unfair labor practice had not been established by a
preponderance of the evidence. The Commission had ruled that the question of
whether the general ability test was inherently discriminatory was not involved in
the proceedings before it. and thus the Illinois court did not review the finding or
order of the hearing examiner. The court based its decision on its finding that the
plaintiff had in fact passed the test, and refused to consider whether the test was
inherently discriminatory because the plaintiff had not raised the question of inherent
discrimination in his complaint. Motorola, Inc. v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Comm'n, 34 Ill. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286, 288 (1966).
176. 35 Fed. Reg. 12333 (1970) (guidelines on testing procedures established by the
EEOC). The EEOC position has been elaborated in guidelines which require that em-
ployers using tests have data available demonstrating that the test is predictive of or sig-
nificantly correlated with important elements of work behavior comprising or relevant
to the job or jobs for which guidelines are being evaluated. Id.
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lation prohibiting discrimination in employment and promulgated reg-
ulations thereunder forbidding inquiries into the "race, color, creed or
national origin of the applicant."' 77 California and Colorado have
gone further by promulgating guildelines for all pre-employment testing.
The California State Fair Employment Commission also has prepared
Guidelines for Testing and Selecting Minority Job Applicants.17 8 The
thrust of the guidelines is that only properly validated examinations
directed at determinations of specific skills and abilities to perform
specific tasks are to be utilized. The Commission requires that: "Each
employer should be certain that the tests he is using are related to his
own specific uses," and that tests "be used as only one indicator of
competence.' 79
In the Commission's view:' 8 0
Measures of personality and interests are not "tests" in the sense that
they have "right" and "wrong" answers. They are intended to indicate
how a person typically acts and feels and the type of activities he likes.
Frequent misuse has produced much controversy concerning these
inventories. These inventories, like other measuring instruments,
should not be used unless validated.
The Commission's Guidelines require: analysis of the performance of
a group of workers who are tested, but whose tests are not used for
any employment decision; comparison of test scores of workers cur-
rently employed and their work performance; and an inter-industry
comparison of test scores of successful workers. 181 Given the generally
questionable validity of personality tests, it is unlikely that any em-
ployer could provide evidence of validity in conformity with these
177. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1462(1):
Unlawful discriminatory practice shall be: For an employer, because of the race,
sex, religious creed, color, national origin or ancestry of any person to refuse to
hire or employ him. ...
178. See BNA, FAIR EMP. PRAc. MAN. 1 451:158c-j (1968).
179. The California Guidelines warn against overly rigorous job qualifications;
many so-called requirements, such as high school graduation, may not be essential to job
performance. While testing may be appropriate for particular jobs, and while good
testing provides "objective information on applicant's abilities and increases the proba-
bility that those selected will succeed," the Commission cautions employers that "im-






regulations. 82 Hence, it is likely that the California Guidelines
amount to an outright prohibition on the use of personality testing as
a pre-employment screening device. 183
2. Labor Arbitration Decisions Involving Psychological Testing
Federal and state labor law deals specifically with pre-employment
testing only in the context of its discriminatory effects. The question
of the required use of tests arises primarily in labor negotiation and
grievance adjudication. The concern of labor unions with regard to
testing practices does not normally extend to the pre-employment situ-
ation, since the union does not represent the employee until he has
been hired. However, union concern with pre-employment testing may
increase as it becomes clear that results of such testing may affect
post-employment promotions.
Unions may negotiate specific provisions in the labor contract to
limit the use of tests, identify specific tests to be used, and limit the
effect of test results. 184 The expanding notion of "conditions of em-
ployment" which are subject to collective bargaining provides the union
with ample authority for compelling negotiation on these issues. t83
The union might thus bargain to include language in the agreement
prohibiting the use of any psychological tests and requiring that sen-
iority will be the sole criterion for promotion, lateral transfer, layoffs,
or rehiring. Short of prohibition, the union might negotiate specific
language to limit the selection and utilization of such tests. 186
182. See text accompanying notes 142-46, supra.
183. See also BNA. FAIR ENII,. PRAC. MAN. 451:195 (1968). Therein is reported
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's Policy' on Isyclhological Tet which parallels
the California provisions requiring validation of tests and prohibits sole reliance on
tests for the employment decision.
184. Newell, A Union View of' Psychological Testing, in Hagglund & Thompson.
.satprat note 119, at 8-17.
185. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210-14 (1964).
186. Examples of such limiting language are: 1) the collective bargaining agreement
between Match & Merryweather. Co., of Cleveland and Local 2155. IAM. which reads
in part:
Tests will be used for the purpose only of determining the eligibility of employees
to be trained on tape controlled machinery or on other equipment with new and
different characteristics.
and 2) the agreement between Brunswick Corp., Muskegon, Mich.. and Local 1813.
IAM. which provides:
The Company agrees that psychological tests designated as the Wonderlic Problem
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Where the labor union has not specifically negotiated for limita-
tions on the utilization of tests, no specific clause granting the com-
pany the right to use "aptitude" or "ability" tests is required before
their use can occur. In effect, arbitrators interpret labor contracts to
contain an implied term or a reserved power allowing the employer to
make decisions on the basis of the workers' skills or aptitudes and to
use reasonable means to acquire information for such decisions
through the use of tests. In Mead Containers, Inc. v. Pulp, Sulphite
and Paper Mill Workers, Local511187 the arbitrator noted that" [o] nly
but a few collective bargaining agreements expressly provide for the
use of written tests in the selection of job applicants ... ." While test-
ing itself was not prohibited where the collective bargaining agreement
was otherwise silent, the arbitrator attempted to ensure that the tests
be appropriate and fair by providing guidelines similar to the follow-
ing:188 (1) in the absence of contract prohibition, an employer has
the right to administer aptitude tests to determine an applicant's quali-
fications for a job; 89 (2) an employer may exclude from consideration
an applicant who declines to take a test; 90 (3) tests should be reason-
ably related to the duties required for a particular job and reasonably
designed to measure the applicant's aptitude, skill, and ability; (4)
tests should be fairly administered and graded and the results should
Solving Test shall not be used for determining an employee's ability to perform
under the job application of the layoff and recall procedures of this agreement.
Hagglund & Thompson, supra note 119, at 13-14.
187. 35 Lab. Arb. 349, 352 (1960). In Mead Containers the union did not deny the
validity of the tests used but had "resisted the use of tests primarily on the grounds that
they are not authorized or contemplated by the agreement, and have never previously
been used by management." The arbitrator noted, however, that "the instant grievance
does not involve any question as regards the nature of the test or the manner in which it
is to be administered. An employee is adequately protected in the event he should claim
that the test is unreasonable or that the method of scoring was unfair." Id. at 353.
188. Id. at 353.
189. It is the majority position that the employer may unilaterally institute testing,
barring any contractual prohibition. See Standard Oil Co., I1 Lab. Arb. 810, 811
(1948). Contra, Central Soya Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 1027, 1031 (1963); Acme-Newport Steel
Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 1002, 1005 (1959). A past practice of not giving tests does not estab-
lish a prohibition against future use of such tests. See, e.g., New Jersey Bell Tel. Co.,
49 Lab. Arb. 735,737 (1967); contra, Bethlehem Steel Corp., 48 Lab. Arb. 1205,
1208 (967).
190. A decision not to promote or transfer for refusal to take a test appears to be
permitted by the majority of cases. While the above position is inconsistent with the
general rule that test results are to be only one basis for determining ability and that a
mechanical reliance on test scores is arbitrary and unreasonable, it is generally based on
the premise that refusal to take a test is disobedience of a valid work order. See, e.g.,
Link-Belt Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 720, 722 (1965). See also St. Regis Paper Co., 40 Lab. Arb.
562 (1963). Contra, American Meter Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 856, 862 (1963).
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be evaluated and appraised together with other relevant factors; (5)
the claim of any employee that the tests are arbitrary, or that they
were administered in an arbitrary manner, or that the results were
applied unfairly is subject to the grievance procedure. While it is clear
that testing per se is not prohibited, the validity of any specific test can
be brought into question. The crucial question is whether the tests are
fair and reasonable methods of measuring skill and aptitude.
Where the question of test validity has arisen in labor arbitration, it
has been held that the test instrument used must measure particular
skills and abilities required. This requirement is represented by Inter-
national Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Communication Workers of America:191
Tests, per se, cannot be said to be an improper method for making
judgments of the kind here under consideration, provided that the test
used in a particular instance is one which reasonably measures the
particular aspect of the individual's personality or attainment with
which the person, group or organization doing the testing is con-
cerned. The preparation and giving of tests is an endeavor calling for
considerable experience, skill and perceptiveness. The so-called stand-
ardized tests are the result of much trial-and-error until dependable
results can be attained from their use. The fact that use of tests is rec-
ognized and accepted procedure in industry and other areas does not
provide a blanket validity for any particular test, or of the one here
under consideration.
In Butler Manufacturing Co. v. Steelworkers Local 2629,192 where
the arbitrator found the test in question not sufficiently related to the
191. 49 Lab. Arb. 1068, 1070 (1967). The arbitrator concluded that the test in ques-
tion was not sufficiently related to the work in question. "In short, the test as given does
not measure the skills learned by the production Operator in doing her job, but does
measure a kind of beyond-the-job exposure to electronic theory .. ." Id. at 1073. See
Glass Containers Nlfrs. Institute, 47 Lab. Arb. 217 (1966) (test in question related to
skills and qualifications involved in job position).
192. 52 Lab. Arb. 633 (1969). The Arbitrator in Butler stated:
This arbitrator, and others, has sustained management's right to use tests which
have been specifically designed to determine an employee's "skill and ability" to
perform a certain job. However, arbitrators generally have also held that aptitude
tests, not directly related to work in question are properly used by management
only oil tle election, of ln" einplo"eeN, and in counseling .... but such general
tests may not be used as a proper guide for denying a senior employee a promotion.
Id. at 638 (emphasis added). See also Central Soya Co.. 41 Lab. Arb. 1027. 1031 (1963).
Therein the arbitrator observed: "There is no doubt that upon hiring a new employee.
the Company unilaterally may give whatever tests and as many as it thinks prop-
er. . ..
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position involved in a promotion decision; it was indicated in dictum
that the requirement of job-relatedness was not applicable during the
hiring process. The only decision specifically involving personality
testing and the issue of job-relatedness, while expressing doubt as to
the test's validity, rested on a finding that the personality test had not
been relied on in the making of any employment decision.193 Never-
theless, applying the general principles of job-relatedness, one can
conclude that reliance on such standardized personality testing would
not be upheld.
A second criterion of validity is the character of the sample group
on which the test itself is validated. The majority view is that the tests
must be specifically designed or specifically validated on individuals
performing in the specific job category in question. An objective test
standing alone or a national mean score will not suffice as a standard
for performance; experimentation on workers in like positions per-
forming like tasks is required.' 94 Without specific validation, the sig-
nificance of test results is speculative and the use of any particular
score on a standardized test is indefensible.
Tests must be uniform, fairly graded, fairly administered and non-
discriminatory. Where these standards are not met, an employer's de-
cision based on test results will be rejected as arbitrary, capricious and
193. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1401, 1410 (1961). The arbitrator
expressed doubt as to the job related validity of a standardized personality test:
The Board, like the union, has some concern over the Minnesota Multiphasic Per-
sonality Inventory, there is some hazard in this test if it is given undue weight. It is
true that the great majority of successful candidates were "O.K.ed" on this test. But
other employees with a favorable rating on this test were not selected. On balance,
the Board does not believe there is sufficient evidence to warrant a conclusion that
the MMPI unduly guided the selection for the disputed job.
194. National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 44 Lab. Arb. 92 (1964). The arbitrator
suggested the basis for establishing test norms is a group of individuals in the same oc-
cupation as that of the individual being tested:
When a test has been given to a large number of candidates for an occupation and
the test results correlated with performance in the occupation, and when this corre-
lation reveals a consistent relationship between particular test performances as
success (or failure) in the occupation, we may be in a position to affirm with con-
fidence that the tests are a reliable screening devise [sic] and that some particular
score is critical.
Id. at 95. See also Glass Containers Mfrs. Institute, 47 Lab. Arb. 217, 223 (1966) (dis-
cussing with approval the extensive efforts on the part of the employer to validate the 
tests used); United States Steel Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 1160, 1166-68 (1967) (giving de-
tailed discussion of the establishment of test norms for employment purposes). Contra,
American Oil Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 1227, 1232 (1968) (upholding use of standardized tes
with general norms as decisional criteria).
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unreasonable. 1115 Yet even where properly validated, the general view
is that test scores cannot be the sole determinant of an employee's
abilities and qualifications. A company judgment based entirely on
test scores is generally held to be invalid as being "arbitrary, capri-
cious, and unreasonable."' 196 Other assessments of ability, such as
acquired knowledge, prior training, and prior work experience, must
be considered in making determinations as to ability. National Seal
Co. v. Rubber Workers, Local 4621917 rejected the contention that
the employer had the right to deny the grievant a job solely because
of her failure to pass an examination designed to test her proficiency
in simple mathematics, where the job would involve the making of
simple computations. In Containers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 695198
the use of "cut-off' scores was expressly held invalid even where an
"industrial norming project" had validated the scores in the industrial
work context, on the ground that by using such score standards the
company was, in effect, making the result of aptitude tests the sole
determinant of ability. Even where workers have similar experience
and training it has been generally held that only substantial differences
in test scores will suffice for discrimination on the basis of ability. 199
While arbitrators have conceded the right to make initial employ-
ment decisions on the basis of test results and have permitted em-
ployers to utilize tests in making determinations of ability where the
use of tests is not specifically prohibited by the collective bargaining
agreement, the attitude of arbitrators toward testing is cautious. The
right of the union to submit the propriety of a particular test or the
utilization of test results to arbitration is unchallenged. Some arbitra-
tors have gone so far as to permit the union to participate in selecting,
administering, and scoring the tests.200 Moreover, some arbitrators
195. See, e.g., John Strange Paper Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 1184, 1187 (1965).
196. See, e.g., Perfect Circle Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 817, 823 (1964).
197. 29 Lab. Arb. 29, 35 (1957). While the arbitrator noted the widespread use of
testing, and its utility in making employment decisions more objective, and conceded
the validity of the test in question, he nevertheless concluded:
The use of tests is properly a supplement to other personnel evaluation tools and
techniques. Accordingly, there appears no warrant for making a final and conclu-
sive evaluation of each employee's rights to a job solely on the basis of the results of
the test. ...
Ic. at 36.
198. 49 Lab. Arb. 589, 593 (1967). But see Martin Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 1116. 1123
(1966) (approving the standard of a "passing grade").
199. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 1160, 1172 (1967).
200. E.g., Central Soya Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 1027, 1031 (1963).
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manifest a general apprehension toward tests, suggesting that past
work records and probationary evaluation provide a superior basis for
employment decisions. 201 This general distrust of test scores is evid-
enced by the general rule that the burden of proving the validity of the
tests in question rests with the employer. 20 2
The question of whether psychological tests, and personality tests in
particular, can be required of employees as a matter of course has not
been directly involved in any reported decision. Cases involving ques-
tions of mental incompetence suggest a severe limitation on the use of
such tests once workers are employed. No specific clause permitting
psychological testing is required since it is implicit in every collective
bargaining agreement that the company has the right not to employ or
retain anyone who might endanger fellow workers or who, by reason
of mental impairment, is incapable of properly performing his job.20 3
However, before the company may require the employee to submit to
a psychiatric examination as a condition of continued employment,
there must be substantial reason to believe that by reason of mental
impairment the employee presents a danger to himself or fellow em-
ployees or cannot properly perform his work.20 4 Where there is a
basis for concern about the employee's mental condition, and both psy-
chological tests and an examination by a psychiatrist reveal that the
employee's mental condition provides a serious risk, the employer is
justified in removing a worker from a job involving those identified
risks.205 Where reinstatement has been at issue, it has been clear in
several opinions that the examination serving as the basis of the em-
ployment decision must be a recent examination: "An employee who
is physically or mentally ill may not be forever condemned to be de-
prived of the right to employment; when the conditions have changed
so as to require re-evaluation of the existence of a legitimate reason or
basis for denial of employment, he is entitled to further considera-
201. See Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 267, 268 (1965).
202. See, e.g., National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 44 Lab. Arb. 92 (1964). But
see Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 267, 268 (1965). In Trans World Airlines
the arbitrator observed: "The Board has no way of knowing the accuracy and value of
the test. It will have to assume that management is not wasting its time in giving useless
tests."
203. See Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 959 (1964).
204. See United States Steel Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 572 (1970).
205. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 137, 138 (1964).
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tion."2 -06 On this basis, it would seem indefensible to administer psy-
chological tests, particularly personality tests, as a matter of course
and to place the results in the employee's file so that they might be uti-
lized in making future employment decisions. Moreover, one can con-
clude that the employer generally has no right to subject employees to
psychological testing or psychiatric examination without just cause,
but the proscription of psychological testing by arbitrators under
collective bargaining agreements affords no protection to prospective
employees who are beyond the coverage of such agreements.
III. AN ARGUMENT FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION OF POLYGRAPH AND
PERSONALITY TESTING
The congressional committees which considered the use of the poly-
graph and personality testing by the federal government in its employ-
ment activities repeatedly heard sweeping arguments condemning
such testing as an infringement of an individual's constitutional rights,
particularly the right of privacy.207 Certainly the concern with privacy
is not new nor is there any absence of literature, both popular and
scholarly, exploring the concept and efficacy of a right of privacy and
examining the threat to personal privacy in modern society. 208 More-
over, a substantial body of literature has been developed on the
common law recognition of the right to privacy.209 Yet little has been
written on particular applications of a constitutional right of privacy
outside of the context in which it was first clearly applied by the
United States Supreme Court, 210 or outside of the area of criminal
investigation where it has been most fully developed.2t
206. Ashtabula Bow Socket Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 37t, 383 (1965). See also United
States Steel Corp., 46 Lab. Arb. 545, 548-49 (1966).
207. See, e.g., Statement of Representative Cornelius Gallagher in 1965 Senate
Ilearing, stipira note 6, at 534.
208. See, e.g., V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM (1967).
209. See, e.g., Prosser, P'rivacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Bloustein, Privacy ao
an Aspect of Hunian Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962
(1964); Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960).
210. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Sympos iin---Tle
Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965); Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Ex-
panding Right of Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 979.
211. See notes 227-56 and accompanying text, infra.
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As early as the end of the nineteenth century, Warren and Brandeis
published their landmark article21 2 which argued the common law
basis of the right of privacy and urged the courts to protect the "right
to be left alone. '21 3 Many state courts gave judicial recognition to a
right of privacy,214 while other states established the right to varying
degrees of privacy through legislative action.21 5 The common law and
legislative recognition of privacy was firmly rooted in property rights:
the property interest in the intellectual content of a letter,21 6 and the
proprietary interest in the use of one's name in advertising.21 7 There
was a close relationship between invasion of privacy and defama-
tion.218 There remained a strong strain of judicial opinion, however,
which found the right of privacy to be intrinsic to the human
personality. 219
Privacy has been workably defined as:220
the right of the individual to decide for himself, with only extraordi-
nary exceptions in the interest of the whole society, when and under
212. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890).
Therein the authors stated:
The protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions expressed through
the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication,
is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual
to be let alone.
213. In those jurisdictions which have established a common law right of privacy, a
party subjected to such testing as a requirement for employment might well have a cause
of action for invasion of privacy, for a claim of actual damages and even for punitive
damages. An analogy is provided in the debt collection cases where publication of an
owed debt is made in order to coerce payment; such debt collections have been held to
invade the debtor's privacy. See Trammel v. Citizen's News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148
S.W.2d 588 (1951).
The difficulty of such a common law approach is illustrated by the court's opinion in
Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962). Therein the court held
that an employer's photographing employees for purposes of studies to increase effi-
ciency of operation and promote safety did not violate the state common law right of
privacy of the employee.
214. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927); Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.W. 65 (1904).
215. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1948); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-650 (1950).
216. Woolsy v. Judd, 4 Duer. 374 (Sup. Ct. N.Y., 1855).
217. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.W. 65 (1904);
but see Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
218. See Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 121 S.W. 444 (1909).
219. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 50 S.W. 65 (1904).
See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (dissenting opinion). The opinion
cites with approval a statement of Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the
United States: "Privacy is the basis of individuality."
220. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (emphasis added).
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it/hat conditions his thoughts, speech, and acts should be revealed to
others.
Privacy is thought to be necessary to assure personal autonomy22 t the
ability to withdraw, the opportunity for introspection and the occasion
for sharing of confidences and intimacies.222 Some even view privacy
as intrinsic to the integrity of the personality, for "... privacy is
not just one possible means among others to insure some other value,
but that it is necessarily related to ends and relations of the most fun-
damental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust."22 3
If there is any vitality in the concept, it is compromised by the use
of polygraph and personality tests that are designed to overbear the
will of the individual by analyzing uncontrolled physiological res-
ponses or by reaching behind conscious articulation in analyzing test
responses to determine unconscious feelings and attitudes. This com-
promise of personal integrity occasioned by an invasion of individual
privacy is exacerbated by the nature of polygraph interrogation and
the intimate character of the questions utilized in personality testing.
To find a constitutional prohibition of polygraph and personality tests
requires, first, the establishment of a constitutional right of privacy on
which the prohibition can be based and, second, a basis for finding
that employers are barred from invasion of that right.
A. The Right of Privacy
While the right of privacy is implicit in "search and seizure" deci-
sions before the turn of the century2 24 and its explicit recognition was
argued in the first wiretapping case to reach the Supreme
Court,2 2 5 the Court did not give explicit recognition to the right until
221. See 1966 Sentate learintigs, %upra note 164. at 239. See al.% OFFICE OF SCI-
ENCE AND TEciINOLOGY. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAl RESEARCH
2 (1967). Therein it was stated:
The right to privacy is the right of the individual to decide for himself how much
he will share with others his thoughts. his feelings, and the facts of his personal
life. It is a right that is essential to insure dignity and freedom of self-determina-
tion.
222. See Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issites and Proposals for the 1970'.
(pt. 1). 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1022-31 (1966).
223. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968).
224. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
225. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 428 (1927).
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1965 in a case involving dissemination of birth control information.2 26
While the right has not received extensive development in subsequent
cases, it can be best understood by examining the argument which
supported its recognition, and by studying those cases involving crim-
inal investigation, where the right of privacy has received its fullest
exposition.
The United States Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut,227
held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of con-
traceptive devices and explicitly recognized a right of privacy. The
Court found this right, while not expressly provided in the Constitu-
tion, to be the result of the interrelationship of express Constitutional
provisions and to be necessary for the implementation of these ex-
pressed protections. After reviewing the specific rights enumerated in
the Constitution, the Court concluded that these "[v] arious guarantees
create zones of privacy. '228 The Griswold opinion expressed a concern
that to require exposure of one's beliefs, attitudes, and associations
would chill the free exercise of first amendment rights. Certainly
it is clear that required disclosure of associations, statements or beliefs
operates to discourage the exercise of those fundamental civil rights.229
The chilling principle provides a ready basis for challenging the con-
stitutional use of polygraph and personality testing, which often ex-
tracts damaging information about the subject's history, associations,
and beliefs.2 30
The two most significant lines of cases which have particular
bearing on the right of privacy are those involving the right against
226. Griswold v. United States, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 484.
229. See NAACP v. Alabama, 371 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). See also Williams v.
Rhddes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968). Williams held that freedom of association is pro-
tected from state encroachment by the fourteenth amendment. See generally Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
230. See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1967). Schneider involved inquiry
into the beliefs, membership, and participation of seamen in organizations on the At-
torney General's List of Subversive Organizations. The Court found the general inquiry
to be unconstitutional and stated:
The purpose of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, unlike more recent models
promoting a welfare state, was to take government off the backs of the people.
See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965); Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957). In reversing a contempt citation the Court in Watkins referred to
". .. the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the Judiciary to insure that the
Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor
abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion, or assembly." Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
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self-incrimination and those involving the prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures. These decisions lead to recognition that a right
of privacy is valuable in itself, and the conclusion that privacy is an
intrinsic attribute of individuality.
The fifth amendment cases involving the use of evidence obtained
in violation of the right against self-incrimination provide authority
for finding mandatory submission to polygraph or personality testing
to be violative of basic constitutional protections. The extraction of
physiological responses by the polygraph and the recording of uncon-
scious and attitudinal responses by psychological testing find most apt
analogies in the extractions of evidentiary information in Rochin v.
California,=- ' and Schmerber v. California,23 2 where the constitu-
tionality of obtaining incriminating information through bodily ex-
tractions from suspects was considered.
In Rochin, where the suspect's stomach had been pumped to obtain
narcotic evidence, 233 the Court found no valid distinction between a
verbal confession extracted by physical abuse and a confession
wrested from defendant's body by physical abuse. The Court con-
cluded:23 4
[T]he proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more
then offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism.
• . .This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking
into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and
remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
contents . . . is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They
are methods too close to the rack and screw ...
The use of the polygraph which records psychological responses be-
yond the control of the subject involves a like affront to the integrity
of the individual. The probing questions and recording of the uncon-
scious of the subject that is the heart of personality testing likewise
invades the privacy of the subject by intruding into his private person-
ality. To permit these devices is merely to approve a "white glove"
rack and screw.
231. 342U.S. 165(1951).
232. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
233. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
234. /d. The majority opinion emphasized the unreliability of compelled testimony.
not that personal liberty and dignity are compromised by compulsion.
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Additional authority for this position is provided by Schmerber,
which upheld the admissibility of a blood-alcohol analysis conducted
on a suspect under arrest. The Court took pains to distinguish the ex-
traction of the blood sample from a compulsory polygraph examina-
tion which, the Court suggested, would pose significant problems of
self-incrimination under the fifth amendment. The court differentiated
between compelling a "confession" and subjecting a suspect to "fin-
gerprinting, photographing, or measurements." In drawing this dis-
tinction between communications and testimony, on one hand, and a
compulsion which makes the suspect the source of real or physical
evidence, on the other, the Court cautiously provided dicta most
helpful for determining the status of polygraph and personality
testing:235
There will be many cases in which such a distinction is not readily
drawn. Some tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical evidence,"
for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in bodily function
during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses
which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to submit to
testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or inno-
cence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is
to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.
If the Schmerber Court is correct in concluding that the physiological
responses obtained from the polygraph are testimonial, then compul-
sory submission to such testing is a violation of the fifth amendment.
The written or spoken responses required in personality testing like-
wise involve the elicitation of opinions, beliefs and feelings which are
testimonial in nature and likewise involve problems of self-incrimina-
tion. While these decisions involve compelled testimony in the context
of criminal interrogation, the nature of an employer's inquiries about
past deeds and guilt is often indistinguishable from criminal interroga-
tion. Moreover, the loss of personal liberty or property which would
result from a criminal conviction is often no more significant than the
denial of livelihood which may result from compelled testimony
concerning past and present activities, associations, and even beliefs
during pre-employment or promotion screening via personality and
polygraph testing.
235. Schnerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
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The fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches
also provides a foundation for the concept of a right of privacy as well
as an independent constitutional limitation upon polygraph and per-
sonality testing. An early case, Boyd v. United States,236 held that
compelling production of personal business records by a defendant in
a criminal action violates the fourth amendment and provided dicta in
support of a personal right of privacy creating an immunity from
search, which has since been given effect:23 7
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security .... [T] hey apply to all invasions
on the part of the government and its employees of the scanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his door,
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has
never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense.
The broad reading of the fourth amendment protections projected in
Boyd was severely restricted in Ohnstead v. United States,238 where
the Court held that wiretapping was not proscribed by the fourth
amendment as an "unreasonable search and seizure." The Court held
that the Framers intended only to forbid search of material things and
the seizure of tangible items. Ten years later in Nardone v. United
States,23 , the Court found that protection against wiretapping had been
provided in the 1934 amendment to the Federal Communications
Act.240 The question of the permissible scope of electronic eaves-
dropping under the "physical trespass" requirement continued to
trouble the Court; a detectaphone placed against a wall was held not
236. 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
237. Id. at 630.
238. 277 U.S. 438 (1927). In a vigorous dissent Mr. Justice Brandeis anticipated the
development and utilization of polygraph and personality testing and argued that it
ought to be forbidden, along with wiretapping:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is
not likely to stop with wiretapping. ... Advances in the psychic and related sci-
ences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts, and emotions.
/i. at 474.
239. 302 U.S. 379 (1937). See also Nardone v. United States. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
240. See Federal Communication Act § 605. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964). See Berger v.
United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Berger held that a New York warrant for wiretapping
was defective by fourth amendment standards for failure to require with specificity the
communications to be intercepted.
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to violate the fourth amendment, 241 while a spike microphone driven
approximately one foot into the wall was found to be a trespass and
hence a search proscribed by the fourth amendment. 242 The arbitrari-
ness of this distinction became clear in Clinton v. Virginia243 where
the Court in a per curium opinion reversed a conviction which had
been based on eavesdrop evidence obtained through the use of a
mechanical listening device "stuck in" the wall with approximately
the penetration of a thumb tack, holding that sufficient penetration
had occurred to constitute trespass and hence a search in violation of
the fourth amendment.
A related series of cases involves the admissibility of testimony ob-
tained through the use of recording devices hidden on agents who
engage suspects in incriminationg conversations. The general rule has
been that where there is no technical trespass-that is, where the sus-
pect consents to the agent's presence or where a warrant is secured-
the testimony thus obtained is admissible. 244 In Osborn v. United
States,245 Mr. Justice Douglas vigorously dissented from the Court's
upholding the admissibility of a recording obtained from such an in-
strument, urging that the use of the agent "posing in a different role
for the purpose of obtaining evidence" compounded "the invasion of
privacy by using hidden recording devices to record incriminating
statements" in violation of the right of privacy developed in Griswold.
Justice Douglas went on to express concern with the use of polygraph
and personality testing:246
We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is open
to surveillance at all times. . . . Secret observation booths in govern-
ment offices and closed television circuits in industry, extending even
to rest rooms are common. . . . Personality tests seek to ferret out a
man's innermost thoughts on family life, religion, racial attitudes, na-
tional origin, politics, atheism, ideology, sex and the like. . . . Poly-
graph tests of government employees and of employees in industry are
rampant. . . . The dossiers of all citizens mount in number and in-
241. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
242. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
243. 377 U.S. 158 (1963), rev'g per curian 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963).
244. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
245. 385 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1966).
246. Id. at 341-43 (emphasis added).
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crease in size. Now they are being put on computers so that by
pressing one button all the miserable, the sick, the suspect, the unpo-
pular, the offbeat people of the Nation can be instantly identified.
These examples and many others demonstrate an alarming trend
whereby the privacy and dignity of our citizens is being whittled away
by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each step may
be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there begins to
emerge a society quite unlike any we have seen-a society in which
government may intrude into the secret regions of man's life at will.
The concern of the dissent in Osborn was alleviated to a great extent
by the decision in Berger v. United States,2 47 which required a war-
rant to wiretap, and particularly by the decision in Katz v. United
States,248 where conversations overheard by an electronic listening
and recording device placed on the outside of a public telephone
booth were held to be inadmissible. While not fully developing a right
of privacy under the fourth amendment, the Court rejected an anal-
ysis limiting the fourth amendment protection to freedom from phys-
ical intrusion. In rejecting the doctrine of "constitutionally protected
areas," the Court viewed the fourth amendment not as protection of
the home from trespass, but as protection of the privacy of the indi-
vidual: 249
For the Fourth Amendment protects people not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected.
247. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See note 240.
248. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz the Court specifically held that Ohnstead and
Goldman had been so eroded by subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine was
no longer controlling. Id. at 353. But see United States. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
This case specifically limited the effect of the Katz decision so as not to disturb the On
Lee holding. The Court in White held that a police agent who engages a defendant in a
conversation may, without a warrant authorizing his conversation, take notes of, simul-
taneously record, or electronically transmit those conversations without disturbing a
defendant's fourth amendment rights. The basic premise is that the defendant freely
chooses to speak with the agent and takes the risk, as he does with any conversation, that
it will be repeated.
249. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. See also Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643. 655 (1961). In
Mapp the Court stated:
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth. it is enforce-
able against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal
Government.
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While in a recent decision the Court rejected a subjective definition of
"privacy expectation," it reitereated its view that the fourth amend-
ment precludes violations without a warrant of "expectations of pri-
vacy [which] are constitutionally 'justifiable'.1250 Compulsory sub-
mission to polygraph testing and the "fishing expedition" conducted in
the pre-employment screening interrogation, as well as the sifting of
the mind and emotions of the subject in personality testing, constitute
exposures of the private person which invade objective expectations of
privacy. The "search" which is conducted with these test instruments
strips the subject bare.
A related objection to the use of these testing devices based on the
fourth amendment is that even if the information being obtained is
properly the concern of employers, any less intrusive means for ob-
taining this information must be used first. The Supreme Court in
Stanley v. Georgia251 held that a search of a private home for obscene
material could not be justified on the basis of the state's interest in
regulating the sale and distribution of pornographic material where
there were other means, less intrusive than the search of a private
home, to accomplish this legitimate state purpose. Citing with ap-
proval Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead arguing for the recogni-
tion and protection of a right of privacy, the Court held the search
involved to be unreasonable, and observed that "fundamental is the
right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one's privacy. '252 To a great extent, the
need to determine a worker's suitability for employment can be satis-
fied through the use of the less restrictive pre-employment interview,
assessment of references, investigation of prior work history, and pro-
bationary work period. The requirement of least restrictive means of
achieving a state interest, combined with a strong determination to
preserve inviolate the individual's rights of privacy because of its close
proximity to other preferred freedoms, seems to compel, therefore,
holding the use of pre-employment polygraph and personality testing
unconstitutional.
While the right of privacy has been most fully developed in the
250. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
251. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
540 (1967) (warrant required for administrative search).
252. Stanley. 394 U.S. at 564.
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criminal procedure area, the right to privacy developed by the Court
under the fourth amendment limitation on "unreasonable search and
seizure" is not limited to criminal prosecutions or utilization of exclu-
sionary rules; unlike the text of the fifth amendment, the fourth
amendment does not use the word criminal with reference to its prohi-
bitions. A contrary result had been suggested in Frank v. Maryland,25 3
in which the Court upheld a longstanding administrative practice of
levying a fine against a homeowner who refuses to permit a health
inspector to search the premises without a warrant, reasoning that
only searches for criminal evidence are prohibited by the fourth
amendment. This position was rejected in 1967 in Camara v. Munic-
ipal Court:254 "It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and
his private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment only
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Focusing on
the privilege against unreasonable search and seizure rather than on
the exclusionary rule, the Court proceeded on the premise that the
individual had no means to challenge the inspector's decision to
search except by refusing him admittance and risking assessment of a
fine: "The practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant sub-
ject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the
discretion to invade private property which we have consistently cir-
cumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the
need to search.1255 The majority went onto consider the availability of
less objectionable means of vindicating the valid state interest in
health inspection; suggesting that a warrant on a showing of probable
cause was necessary and appropriate for health inspections. 256
It is no great extension of the principle set down in Camara to say
that if a noncriminal investigatory search without a warrant infringes
recognized constitutional protections, then a noncriminal interroga-
tion utilizing devices such as the polygraph and personality test which
253. 359U.S. 360(1959).
254. 387 U.S. 523. 530 (1967). But %ee Wyman v. James. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
Wlmian upheld home visitations under New York welfare laws. The Court sug-
gested that these visitations were not searches, but even if they amounted to searches.
they were not unreasonable. The agency was found to be administering a public
trust and to be dispensing private charity. The Court held there was no feasible alter-
native for the purpose of insuring the proper administration of the aid to dependant
children program of the state welfare agency.
255. Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33.
256. Id. at 533.
136
Vol. 47: 73, 1971
Polygraph and Personality Testing
infringe on protected constitutional rights is not beyond constitutional
restriction merely because of the noncriminal character of the interro-
gation.
B. The Privilege Doctrine
An initial objection to protecting prospective employees from man-
datory submission to testing procedures is that by seeking the "privi-
lege" of employment the prospective employee "consents" to such
testing as the employer might require. The spurious character of such
a consent has already been discussed. 257 and it should be sufficient to
note that the unequal bargaining position of a prospective employee in
face of the economic necessity of employment, and in face of the
widespread requirement of submission to testing necessarily removes
that voluntary element which is crucial to the concept of consent.
The question of the "privilege" of employment presents a much
more difficult constitutional question than that of consent and will be
explored in the context of governmental employment. The privilege
doctrine was tersely stated by Justice Holmes for the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford.258
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he
has no right to be a policeman." The doctrine was broadly applied in
Barsky v. Board of Regents,2 59 where a physician's license was sus-
pended under the New York State Education Law following his con-
viction for contempt of Congress for declining to produce certain
papers for the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The jus-
tification for the suspension of the doctor's license was his criminal
conviction, even though there was no showing that the acts for which
he was convicted were in any way related to his competence or profes-
sional integrity as a physician: "The practice of medicine in New
York is lawfully prohibited by the State except upon the conditions it
257. See text accompanying notes 244-50, supra.
258. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892). Justice Holmes discussed the
notion of privilege in the general context of the employment relationship:
There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend
his constitutional right to free speech, as well as of idleness, by the implied terms of
his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms
which were offered him.
259. 347 U.S. 442 (1953).
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imposes. Such practice is a privilege granted by the State under its
substantially plenary power to fix the terms of admission.2 60
The movement away from the doctrine of privilege was gradual. An
intermediate position was the requirement of a substantial state in-
terest before civil liberties could be restricted as a condition of em-
ployment. In a case involving a loyalty oath required of all state em-
ployees, the United States Supreme Court reasoned: "We need not
pause to consider whether an abstract right to employment exists. It is
sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the
public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbi-
trary or discriminatory. '261 While the Court conceded a state's in-
terest in determining the loyalty of its employees, it found the loyalty
oath in question to be a violation of due process.
With the rejection of the doctrine of privilege the Supreme Court
increasingly recognized that certain abridgments of the substantive
rights of public employees are unconstitutional. On the basis of the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the court in Slo-
chower v. Board of Higher Education262 upheld the right of a public
employee to refuse to testify before a congressional committee without
subjecting himself to dismissal. The Court observed:2 63
260. Id. at 451. In a dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Douglas argued for the recogni-
tion of a "right to work." He stated:
The right to work. I had assumed, was the most precious liberty that man possesses.
Man has indeed as much right to work as he has to live, to be free, to own property.
The American ideal was stated by Emerson in his Essay on Politics, "A man has a
right to be employed, to be trusted, to be loved, to be revered." It does many men
little good to stay alive, and free and propertied, if they cannot work. To work
means to eat. It also means to live. For many it would be better to work in jail.
than to sit idle on the curb. The great values of freedom are the opportunities af-
forded man to press to new horizons, to pit his strength against the forces of nature,
to match skills with his fellow man.
The dictum of Holmes gives a distortion to the Bill of Rights. It is not an instru-
ment of dispensation but one of deterrents. Certainly a man has no affirmative
right to any particular job or skill or occupation. The Bill of Rights does not say
who shall be doctors or lawyers or policemen. But it does say that certain things
shall not be done. And so the question here is not what government must give. but
rather what it may not take away.
Id. at 472-73.
261. Wyman v. Updegraff. 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
262. 350 U.S. 551 (1955).
263. Id. at 555. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (guaranteeing
freedom of association to public school teachers); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961) (guaranteeing freedom of religion to public employees); Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (guaranteeing freedom of speech to public employees).
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The problem of balancing the State's interest in the loyalty of those in
its service with the traditional safeguards of individual rights is a con-
tinuing one. To state that a person does not have a constitutional right
to government employment is only to say that he must comply with
reasonable, lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by proper
authorities.
The demise of the doctrine of privilege began in a case which in-
volved the use of statements obtained from a defendant policeman
under the threat of dismissal. In Garrity v. New Jersey264 the court
reasoned "[t] he choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs
or incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of livelihood
or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free
choice to speak out or remain silent." Specifically rejecting the Mc-
A uliffe privilege doctrine the Court held:265
We conclude that policemen like teachers and lawyers, are not rele-
gated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights. There are
rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condi-
tion by the extraction of a price.
In Gardner v. Broderick,2 66 the Court held that public employees,
policemen in this instance, could not be removed for refusing to waive
their privilege against self-incrimination before grand juries investi-
gating their activities.
Critical in Gardner was the Court's restriction of the proper scope
of inquiry into the qualifications and performance of public employees
to "questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the per-
formance of . . . official duties. '2 67 Certainly these limits are ex-
ceeded by polygraph and personality testing as presently conducted. It
has also been seen that to condition public employment on submission
to polygraph or personality testing infringes the right of privacy under
the fourth and fifth amendments and is therefore permissible only
where a substantial state interest is shown to be served. But given the
wide availability of recorded data and investigative sources, the unre-
liability of polygraphy, and the questionable validity of personality
264. 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1966).
265. Id. at 500.
266. 392 U.S. 273 (1968). See also Uniformed Sanitationmens' Ass'n v. Commis-
sioners, 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
267. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278.
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testing, it is doubtful that the government as employer can bear the
burden of showing such a substantial interest that the prospective em-
ployee ought to be compelled to relinquish his right of privacy by
submission to such testing as a condition of employment.
There can be little doubt that public employment is not a privilege
which can be conditioned on the relinquishment of constitutional
protections. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents268 the Court observed: 26 9
[Formerly, the] premise was that public employment, including aca-
demic employment, may be conditioned upon the surrender of consti-
tutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government ac-
tion.. . . [However], ... the theory that public employment which
may be denied altogether may be subject to any conditions, regardless
of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.
The Court concluded that it was too late to argue that constitutional
protections and liberties ". . . may be infringed by denial of or
placing conditions upon a benefit or privilege."
C. The State Action Problem
A limitation on the private use of polygraph and personality testing
must be rooted in a substantive constitutional protection such as the
right of privacy discussed above. However, the extension to employees
in the "private" sector of protections such as have been accorded
public employees encounters difficulty due to the requirement of
"state action. '"270
Professor Wolfgang Freidman believes corporations (along with
labor unions, foundations and charitable institutions), by asserting
extensive power over individuals and the economic life of American
society, perform as governmental institutions:271
The corporate organizations of business and labor have long ceased to
be private phenomena. That they have a direct and decisive impact on
the social, economic, and political life of the nation is no longer a
268. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
269. Id. at 605-06.
270. See generally Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961):
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960).
271. Friedman, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Lxw, 57
CoLU ,. L. REV. 155, 176(1957).
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matter of argument. It is an undeniable fact of daily experience. The
challenge to the contemporary lawyer is to translate the social trans-
formation of these organizations from private associations to public
organisms into legal terms.
Freidman identifies three areas of concern for legal control over the
large corporate groups: excessive concentration and abuse of eco-
nomic power, excessive control over national policy, and excessive
group power over the individual as employee.272
The late Adolf A. Berle argued for constitutional limitations on
corporate activity in order to provide protection of personal rights
from invasion through economic power.27 3 Berle believed the modern
state has ultimate responsibility for the national economy and that one
of the devices developed for meeting these economic needs was the
corporation. American corporations, Berle observed, are theoretically
subject to formal (although in effect nominal) control by the law of
the state in which they are incorporated, which is generally exercised,
along with federal authority, when conditions become unsatisfactory.
Noting that a broad area of concern is the relationship between corpo-
rations and the individuals with which they deal, Berle viewed this
area as a "field of growing law" where there "is the tendency to give
specific constitutional or legal protection by individuals in their deal-
ings with private units wielding great economic power. '274 This trans-
272. Id. at 179.
273. Berle, Constitittional Limitations on Corporate Activities---Protection of Per-
sonal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952).
See Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN. L. REV. 620, 662
(1958). Miller argues for the application of constitutional protections against "private
governments" where they "directly affect the value position of individuals;" and sets out
the following argument for the application of the state action doctrine to private groups:
1) The Constitution was framed on the theory that limitations should exist on the
formal exercise of power in government but not on control in fact exercised
unofficially.
2) The essential problem of individual liberty, is one of freedom from arbitrary
restraints, wherever and however imposed.
3) The Constitution should be so construed as to apply to arbitrary applications of
power against individuals by centers of private government.
4) The main flow of group decisions in the factory community would not be
thrown into litigation or controversy by such a constitutional construction, but
only those which directly and substantially affect an individual.
5) It would take only a slight modification of present constitutional doctrine to
effect such a constitutional construction.
Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
274. Berle, supra note 273, at 942.
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lation of constitutional law from the field of political to the field of
economic rights rests on two premises: that the state has created the
corporation and that the corporation now has economic power. It is
the abuse of that power which brings the constitutional protections of
the individual into play. 275 Berle argued that a private corporation is
performing a "public function," and it should therefore be held to the
constitutional standards that apply against the state itself.2 76 Although
noting opinions of the Court to the effect that ". . . the corporation
can no more deprive people of freedom of press and religion than it
can discriminate against commerce,"2 77 Berle conceded that contem-
porary Court opinions278 have required state action to find a constitu-
tional restriction. The case remains open as to whether "state action"
can be found where the corporation is able to enforce its rule, or carry
out its practice, without calling on the state to assist in its enforce-
ment.
2 79
A pristine formulation of the requirement of state action was prov-
ided in United States v. Cruikshank280 where the Court observed:
"The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a Satate from depriving any
person of life, liberty, on property, without due process of law; but
this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another." Nev-
ertheless, the concept of state action, which has been most fully ex-
275. Id. at 942-43. Cf. Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and "Gor-
ernment Action." 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961). In his article Wellington asserts:
Undue fascination with the supposed structural and power similarities unions and
corporations have with government can be misleading . . . some commentators
are motivated by an undisciplined desire to "let the mind be bold". This sort of
thinking deserves little sympathy. The Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amend-
ment are the great instruments with which courts protect the people from misused
governmental power. The view that because unions and corporations are somehow
similar to government they too should be restrained by these same constitutional
provisions has perhaps an aesthetic and emotional appeal. Its analytical shortcom-
ings, however, are fatal. The need to regulate unions and corporates is undeniable:
but it need not be assuoned a priority that the Constitution is the proper regulatory
instrument. Other, more appropriate, means may be available to accomplish the
sanme desirable ends.
Id. at 348 (emphasis added). Wellington suggests regulatory legislation to cope with
employer and union abuses rather than the acceptance of the "state action" notion as
applied to corporations and unions. See also Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principal.s of
Constitttional Lair, 73 HARv. L. Rnv. 1 (1959).
276. Berle, supra note 273, at 948-49. Berle cites, at this stage of his thesis, Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See text accompanying notes 282-83, infma.
277. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 501 n. 4(1946).
278. Berle. smmpra note 273, at 950.
279. Id.
280. 92 U.S. 542, 554(1875).
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plored in the racial discrimination cases, 281 is a developing doctrine of
great vitality. It is possible, for purposes of investigating the presence
of state action, to divide the corporation's pre-employment activities
into three broad categories: the creation of the "private" organization
by the state, the involvement of the state in the operation of a "pri-
vate" organization, and the performance of a public function by the
"private" organization.
In Marsh v. Alabama,282 state authority was invoked to prosecute a
private trespass action against individuals distributing religious litera-
ture in a company town. Here the Court held that the "managers ap-
pointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and reli-
gion of these people consistently with the purpose of the Constitu-
tional guarantees;" the Court explicitly balanced the private property
interests of the corporation against the first amendment liberties of the
alleged trespassers and found that the first amendment liberties "oc-
cupy a preferred position. '283 The Court, however, laid down a more
general proposition: "The more an owner. . . opens up his property for
use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. ' 2 84
Amalgamated Food Employees, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza28 5
extended Marsh to protect peaceful picketing of a business enter-
prise located within a shopping center where the picketing took place
on the shopping center property. The Court reasoned:286
[B] ecause the shopping center serves as the community business
block "and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and
those passing through" the State may not delegate the power, through
the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude these members of the
public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the prem-
ises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to
which the property is actually put.
Since Shelley v. Kramer,287 which involved the enforceability of a ra-
cially restrictive running covenant, there can be no doubt that any act
281. See Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 270, at 4.
282. 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
283. Id. at 508-09.
284. Id. at 506.
285. 391 U.S. 317 (1968).
286. Id. at 319-20.
287. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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by any state agency which assists private parties in restricting constitu-
tionally protected activities is prohibited by the fourteenth amend-
ment.28 8 In Shelley the Court held "that in granting judicial enforce-
ment of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have de-
nied petitioners the equal protection of the law and that, therefore, the
action of the state courts cannot stand."2 8 9 The state creation of an
agency and the grant of power to perform its function, without any
more state involvement, was held in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. 2: 0 to place constitutional limitations on the organization created.
In Steele, the Court held that a union designated by the legislative
branch as exclusive bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act
was compelled to represent all employees in the craft without discrim-
ination.2t9 While it might have been argued that the duty of repre-
sentation is imposed by the terms of the Railway Labor Act and that
Steele should not be read as applying the fourteenth amendment to
this statutorily created agency, the Court in Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Howard292 removed all doubt that constitutional re-
straints prevented the statutorily-created union from engaging in ra-
cial discrimination. There the union had influenced employers to dis-
criminate against non-member Negroes; the Court found this activity
to be unconstitutional: "Bargaining agents who enjoy the advantages
of the Railway Labor Act's provisions must execute their trust without
lawless invasions of the rights of other workers."293
The performance of a public function by a private agency is a suffi-
cient basis for bringing constitutional protections to bear, even where
there has been nothing more than "state inaction" in preventing "pri-
vate" infringement of constitutional liberties. In Smith v. Allwright,294
the Court held that rules of the Democratic Party of Texas excluding
Negroes from voting in the party's primaries violated the fifteenth
amendment since a system of primary laws which required a party to
288. See, e.g., Pollak. Racial Discrinzination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Pro-
feSSr WeclIsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. I, 13 (1959).
289. Id. at 20.
290. 323 U.S. 192(1944).
291. Id. at 198.
292. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
293. Id. at 774. See also Syres v. Oil Workers, Local No. 23, 233 F.2d 739. rev'd
Pei. curianz 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (finding that unions engaged in collective bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act were involved in state action).
294. 321 U.S. 649(1944).
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follow certain procedures in nominating candidates converted the
party into an agency of the state insofar as the party determines the
participants in a primary election. 295 The Court concluded: "[The]
right to participate in the choice of elected officials without restriction
by any state because of race . . . is not to be nullified by a state
through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private
organization to practice racial discrimination in the election. '2 96 In
Terry v. Adams, 297 the Court extended constitutional limitations to an
unregulated private political association which conducted pre-primary
elections. The Court found that the Jaybird Club exerted a strong
influence on political activity in Texas, and concluded: "It is imma-
terial that the state does not control that part of this elective process
which it leaves for the Jaybirds to manage. The Jaybird primary has
become an integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the elective
process that determines who shall rule and govern in the county. '298
The opinion in Terry suggests the general proposition that when an
agency becomes responsible for an integral state process, the state
becomes bound to see that that agency conducts itself in conformity
with constitutional protections as the Terry Court noted: "For a state
to permit such a duplication of its election process is to permit a fla-
grant abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of the Fifteenth
Amendment. '299 The notion of "state inaction" amounting to state
action received explicit recognition in a concurring opinion in Bell v.
Maryland,300 where Justice Goldberg disclosed that correspondence
of Justice Bradley, author of the Civil Rights Cases, contained the
statement that: "Denying includes inaction as well as action. And de-
nying the equal protection of the laws includes omission to protect, as
well as the omission to pass laws for protections." Justice Goldberg
added: "These views are fully consonant with this Court's recognition
that state conduct which might be described as 'inaction' can never-
theless constitute responsible 'state action' within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment. '301
295. Id. at 663.
296. Id. at 664.
297. 345 U.S. 461, 463 (1952).
298. Id. at 469.
299. Id. (emphasis added).
300. 378 U.S. 226, 286-318 (Goldberg, J.), (concurring opinion).
301. Id. at 309-11.
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Finally, what may otherwise be private conduct can become so
enmeshed in state regulation or state assistance that "state action" in-
vests the private activity. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity3012 the Court found the owner of a private restaurant located in a
publicly owned and maintained restaurant building dedicated to public
use to be subject to constitutional limitations. The Court formulated
an important guideline for finding state action: "Only by sifting facts
and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance. '" 30 3 The
court concluded: 30 4
By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only
made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its
power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The
State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with Eagle [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint par-
ticipant in the challenged activity, which, on that account cannot be
considered to have been so "purely private" as to fall without the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The transformation of private activity into state action was further
examined in Evans v. Newton,30 5 where, in holding that private park
property entrusted to the city was "invested with state action;" the
Court observed:306
What is "private" action and what is "state" action is not always easy
to determine. Conduct that is formally "private" may become so en-
twined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a govern-
mental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations
placed upon state action.
The alternative rationales in Evans v. Newton illustrate both the state
agency concept and the public function notion which provide inde-
302. 376U.S. 715(1960).
303. Id. at 722.
304. Id. at 725.
305. 382 U.S. 296(1966).
306. Id. at 299. See also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745. 755-56 (1965). In
Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion in Guest the "'state action" concept was discussed:
This is not to say, however, that the involvement of the State need be either exclu-
sive or direct. In a variety of situations the Court has found state action of a nature
sufficient to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause even though the partic-
ipation of the State was peripheral, or its action was only one of several
co-operative forces leading to the constitutional violation.
146
Vol. 47: 73, 197 1
Polygraph and Personality Testing
pendent bases for finding state action. The majority first held that the
substitution of trustees did not remove the taint of state action, finding
that the city's operation of the park, even though it was governed by
private trustees, resulted in the park becoming a state agency. 307 An
alternative basis for finding state action was the concept of public
function: "This conclusion is buttressed by the nature of the service
rendered by a community park. The service rendered even by a pri-
vate park of this character is municipal in nature. °30 8 Mr. Justice
Harlan in his dissent denominated this a "parallel government func-
tion" and properly observed that the concept embraces "a host of
other functions commonly regarded as nongovernmental though par-
alleling fields of government activity." 309 Under the public function
approach, constitutional provisions are found to prohibit the govern-
ment from subjecting its employees to polygraph and personality test-
ing, private employers engaged in the "parallel government function"
of employment and economic production would be similarly restricted.
Two recent federal district court decisions indicate the extent to
which "private" business concerns will be found to be invested with
state action. In Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc.,310 the
court found a tavern's exclusion of women as patrons violated the
fourteenth amendment. Although the only state action involved in the
case was licensing under the New York State Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Law, the court reasoned that, absent the license, the defendant
could not sell beer and hence could not discriminate in the sale of
beer. The court regarded as significant the fact that liquor licensing
involved pervasive regulations and the fact that defendant's license
had been repeatedly renewed: 31'
307. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966). But see Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S.
435 (1970). Abney was a continuation of the controversy involved in Newton. The
United States Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether park property reverted
to the heirs of the donor when the trust which had provided for the maintenance of a seg-
regated city park had become unenforceable. The trial court refused to apply the cy pres
doctrine and held that the "sole purpose" of the trust was frustrated by the decision in
Newton so that the property reverted to the heirs of the donor. The majority held that the
construction of the trust was a question of state law and thus provided an independent
ground for the decision. The Court thereby circumvented the constitutional question.
308. Newton, 382 U.S. at 301.
309. Id. at 322.
310. 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
311. Id. at 604-05.
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We deal with property voluntarily serving the public, devoted to a
business in which volume of patronage is essential to commercial suc-
cess. When a state licenses such an enterprise, in an area peculiarly
subject to state regulation, pursuant to a statute imposing pervasive
controls upon the conduct of the business, and under circumstances in
which state licensing practices endow the license with a certain fran-
chise value as well, the state's involvement in the operation of defend-
ant's business, and hence by implication in the exclusionary practice
under attack, rises to the level of significance within the meaning of
Burton, and requires McSorley's to comply with the proscriptions of
the Fourteenth Amendment "as certainly as though they were binding
covenants written into the [license itself] ."
While Seidenberg relies on the licensing requirement to which sellers
of alcohol are subject, a second district court opinion, Marjorie
Webster Jr. College v. Middle States Ass'n3 12 emphasizes the eco-
nomic power and necessity of the enterprise. Marjorie Webster in-
volved an action under the Sherman Antitrust Act by a proprietary
college to compel its accreditation. While the court found education
to be beyond the Act's definition of commerce, the decision evidences
increased judicial recognition of the public function performed by
"private" associations and of the immense power they wield: 3 13
As a general rule, courts adhere to a policy of noninterference with the
internal affairs of private voluntary associations. Membership in such
a group is considered a privilege and not a right. However, there is an
exception when the association enjoys monopoly power in an area of
vital public concern. If the power, because of public reliance upon it,
is great enough to make membership a necessity for successful opera-
tion, judicial intervention may be justified.
While the question of state action in corporate activities has not
been explicitly dealt with as a general proposition in any judicial deci-
sion, close analogies to existing state action decisions suggest that cor-
porations are within the purview of the fourteenth amendment. The
corporation is a creature of the state, created by statutory authority.
The extensive body of statutory and administrative law dealing with
labor, fair trade, consumer protection and licensing clearly shows
312. 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969).
313. Id. at 469.
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state involvement in "private" activities. Moreover, governmental as-
sistance in the form of contracts, grants, and tariff protections, along
with the subsidization of transportation systems, postal services, and
developmental research, all directly involve the government in busi-
ness activities. Finally, state inaction in failing to alleviate the tremen-
dous imbalance of power between corporate employers and prospec-
tive employees arguably violates the fourteenth amendment just as if
affirmative state intervention had produced the same situation. The
position of the corporation as the primary unit in the American
economy suggests that its production and service activities, if not em-
ployment itself, constitute a public function.3 14 All of these considera-
tions support the conclusion that the invasion of privacy, self-incrim-
ination, and unreasonable searches incident to pre-employment poly-
graph and personality testing are prohibted even to private employers
by the fourteenth amendment.
While there exists an analytic scheme for extending constitutional
protections to the employee of a private entrepreneur, this would
clearly require further development in the right of privacy as well as a
significant extension of the scope of state action. Thus it may be desir-
able, given the evils posed by polygraph and personality testing, to
provide legislative regulation of pre-employment testing.
314. See Testimony of John B. Connally, Secretary of the Treasury, before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, urging the grant of a loan
guarantee to Lockheed, Corp.
[T] he basic motivation for our recommendation is not simply concern for a
particular company or particular industry-although we seem prone to forget
the tremendous contributions made by the defense and aerospace industries to
our security and preparedness. Rather, the primary motivation is a deep concern
for the well-being of the American people....
At a time when the Government is spending $1 2 billion annually on job training
programs, it would be ironic to withhold authority for guarantees-guarantees we
believe will be costless--that could preserve the jobs of 30,000 fully-trained
aerospace workers.
Hearings on Emergency Loan Guarantee Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., at 6-7 (1971). See also
Hearings to Authorize Emergency Guarantees to Major Business Enterprises Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (197 1).
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IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE
PROHIBITION AND REGULATION OF POLYGRAPH
AND PERSONALITY TESTING.
The congressional committees investigating the use of polygraph
and personality tests were strongly urged to support legislation regu-
lating or prohibiting such testing.315
A series of bills was introduced in the Senate in the 89th and 90th
Congresses which culminated in the Senate's passage of Senate Bill
1035, "An Act to protect civilian employees of the executive branch
of the United States Government in the enjoyment of their constitu-
tional rights and to prevent unwarranted governmental invasions of
privacy." This bill died in the House Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service during the 90th Congress. 316 The bill (S1438) was re-
introduced in the 91st Congress and again in the 92nd Congress. It is
presently sponsored by fifty-one senators and has been referred to the
315. See 1965 Senate Hearings, s upra note 6, at 293-94; House Hearings on Pri-
racy, supra note 132, at 350-51. See al.so Statement of John F. Griner, President, Amer-
ican Fed'n of Gov't Employees. 1965 Senate Hearing.s, supra note 6, at 293-94. Griner
urged specific legislation to restrict testing of federal employees, arguing that Civil
Service policy is so broad that it is "meaningless as now written." He urged that where
psychiatric examination was deemed necessary by an employer it should be conducted
under proper medical conditions.
Monroe Freedman of the George Washington University Law School urged the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the House Subcommittee on Gov-
ernment Operations to propose legislation prohibiting the use of psychological tests and
polygraph examinations: "I would respectfully urge that this Subcommittee draft legisla-
tion prohibiting interrogation of Federal employees, of private employees under in-
dustrial personnel security regulations . . . by the use of questions relating to reli-
gion. politics, personal thoughts or habits, private family matters, and sexual matters.
Such legislation is essential. We cannot rely upon self-regulation ....
1965 Senate Hearings, s,apra note 6, at 293-94. Another witness, James C. O'Brien.
Director of the Division of Personnel Management of the Department of Health Educa-
tion and Welfare, opposed prohibitory legislation, arguing that: "We have felt that the
exercise of good administrative judgment can accomplish whatever objectives are
needed with respect to the administration of tests or any other internal selection proce-
dures involving the rights of employees." Id. at 224. An intermediate position was sug-
gested to the Senate Subcommittee by Dr. Zigmond Lebensohn, of the American Psy-
chiatric Association, who outlined a regulatory approach to the problem of the use of
these testing devices including: " [a] n effort by appropriate professional organizations
and agencies to further public understanding of the usefulness and limitations of psy-
chological testing in [employee] screening and selection": "[a] ppointment of advisory
groups of experts from the behavioral sciences to developing guidelines for the utiliza-
tion of tests ... ": "[flormulation of regulations governing the use of tests in the
years ahead . . ."; and the "[e]stablishment of a 'watchdog committee' of experts to
guide the further development of screening and testing procedures in the light of
ongoing experience." Id. at 94.
316. S. 1035, 90th Cong.. IstSess.(1967).
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Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 317 Section l(e) of this bill would
result in a general prohibition of the use of the polygraph and person-
ality testing on federal government employees. 318
Enforcement of the proposed act would be accomplished by admin-
istrative and civil means, including: special agency procedures not
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, with a right to insti-
tute simultaneously a civil suit (section 20); the pursuit of a complaint
before the Board of Employee Rights created under the act (section
5); and direct suit in district court to prevent the threatened violation
or to obtain redress against the consequences of the violation (section
4). Only actions before the Board and civil suits are regarded as mu-
tually exclusive.
The Senate committee found a threefold need for such legislation:
to preserve the rights and liberties of government employees: to pre-
vent the discouragement of highly-qualified persons from seeking gov-
ernment employment and to provide a good example for state govern-
ments, private business, and industry, which might be persuaded to
relinquish their own practices which invaded employees privacy. 319
The committee noted with apprehension the growth of technology and
317. S. 1438, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also S. 782, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970); S. REP. No. 91-873, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970
S. REP.].
318. S. 1438, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). The relevant text of the bill is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any officer of any executive department or any executive
agency of the United States Government, or for any person acting or purporting to
act under his authority, to do any of the following things ...To require or re-
quest, or to attempt to require or request, any civilian employee of the United
States serving in the department or agency, or any person applying for employ-
ment as a civilian employee in the executive branch of the United States Govern-
ment, to submit to any interrogation or examination or to take any psychological
test which is designed to elicit from him information concerning his personal rela-
tionship with any person connected with him by blood or marriage, or concerning
his religious beliefs or practices, or concerning his attitude or conduct with respect
to sexual matters: Provided, however, that nothing contained in this subsection
shall be construed to prevent a physician from eliciting such information or author-
izing such tests in the diagnosis or treatment of any civilian employee or applicant
where such physician deems such information necessary to enable them to deter-
mine whether or not such individual is suffering from mental illness: Provided fur-
ther, however, That this determination shall be made in individual cases and not
pursuant to general practice or regulation governing the examination of employees
or applicants according to grade, agency, or duties: Provided further, however, that
nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit an officer of the
department or agency from advising any civilian employee or applicant of a spe-
cific charge or sexual misconduct made against that person, and affording him an
opportunity to refute the charge.
319. 1970 S. REP., supra note 317, at 3-6.
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complex business organizations which has resulted in unchecked
compromise of individual and personal rights. Moreover, there was an
expressed desire to involve the Congress in the preservation of indi-
vidual rights, rather than leaving the entire burden to the courts. The
committee dealt explicitly with the notion of "consent," concluding
that economic coercion leaves the voluntary nature of most consent to
testing open to serious doubt. 320
The prohibitory approach of S 1438 appears justified in view of the
unreliability of the polygraph and the invalidity of personality testing.
Effective regulation would require an extensive scheme prescribing
qualifications for operators, test administrators, and test evaluators.
Validation of personality tests would necessitate an agency such as the
National Bureau of Standards, as was suggested by one of the propo-
nents of testing during the 1965 hearings. 321 The determination of
work-relatedness would require detailed examination of each job in
question as well as experimentation with each test instrument on per-
sonnel employed on each job where the test is to be utilized.
It is, however, the very real compromise of the integrity of the indi-
vidual and the invasion of his privacy which compel prohibitory legis-
lation. The employer has an entire battery of information at his com-
mand-work references, work record, investigatory procedures, and
review of probationary work records-whereas the individual seeking
employment in the face of economic necessity frequently has few al-
ternatives.
The proposed legislation specifically exempts certain government
employees from the prohibitions where "national security" is at stake.
Since these tests can be "beaten" anyway, this exemption seems to
open the door unnecessarily to other areas of "sensitive" employment.
Moreover, these agencies have even more extensive investigatory tools
at their disposal than other employers, and it would seem sufficient for
them to rely on these in view of the fundamental personal rights at
stake. There seems no good reason to prohibit only polygraph and
personality testing by government employers. The Senate committee
specifically noted with apprehension the wide-spread private use of
these devices and their threat to individual rights. Certainly the need
320. Id. at 5.
321. See 1965 Senate Hearings, sapra note 6. at 270.
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of the private employer for the information obtained by these devices
is no greater than the need of the government employer; certainly the
threat to the individual's integrity and privacy is no less. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provides a model for vindicating civil liberties
through regulatory statutes. The act extends its prohibitions to the pri-
vate sector employer who is defined as a "person engaged in an in-
dustry affecting commerce who has twenty-five or more employees for
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person.1322
Such a definition of "employer" could be developed for purposes of
regulating or prohibiting the use of polygraph and personality testing.
The proposed statute, S1438, relies generally on equitable relief
obtained through administrative and judicial proceedings. Additional
enforcement devices such as the criminal penalties provided by several
state statutes regulating polygraph testing could be added. In order to
encourage the individual employee or prospective employee to insti-
tute proceedings and to broaden the alternative modes of relief, a civil
damages remedy with, possibly, a minimum recovery established in
the statute might be provided as well. Such enforcement and remedy
alternatives would increase the likelihood of securing and protecting
the individual's right to privacy and freedom from interrogation and
examination by polygraph and personality testing.
CONCLUSION
The prospective employee increasingly finds himself subject to uni-
laterally established personnel selection requirements which, for a
great many jobs, include polygraph and personality testing. The relia-
bility of the polygraph and the validity of personality testing are
highly questionable, but the most serious threat posed by the use of
the instrument is the invasion of the personal liberty of the worker
subjected to interrogation. Polygraph testing is an attempt to overbear
the will of the person subjected to testing by measuring uncontrolled
physiological responses, while personality testing poses much the same
problem by attempting to reach beyond the conscious, articulated re-
sponse of the person being examined. It is the character of the interro-
322. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 18 U.S.C. § 241(1964).
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gation itself-focusing on past acts and associations, ferreting out atti-
tudes, opinions, and beliefs about sex, politics, and religion-which
presents the critical threat to individual integrity by the invasion of
personal privacy.
While polygraph testing has been subjected to statutory regulation
in some states, and while judicial and arbitration tribunals have pre-
vented its use in specific cases, pre-employment polygraph testing is
largely uncontrolled. Likewise, personality testing has been prohibited
by federal legislation where it results in discrimination and has been
limited to a greater extent under collective bargaining agreements and
in arbitration proceedings, but there exists no recognized protection
for the prospective employee who faces the requirement of personality
testing in the personnel selection process.
Judicial recognition of the right of privacy, together with the de-
mise of the "doctrine" of privilege in government employment and the
increasing recognition of the "state action" elements involved in cor-
porate enterprise, provide a possible means for protecting personal
employee rights from required subjection to polygraph and person-
ality testing. Yet the most likely route to successful recognition of
employees' right of privacy is federal legislation. Protection of the
prospective employee's privacy depends on societal recognition of
personal privacy as sufficiently important to be guaranteed even at the
loss of some ease of personnel administration. As one considers the
importance of privacy against the utility of informed judgment and the
assurance of accurate decisions, it is well to remember:
For so falls out
That what we have we prize not the worth
Whiles we enjoy it, but being lack'd and lost,
Why then we rack the value, then we find
The virtue that possession would not show us
Whiles it was ours.
Shakespeare, Much Ado About
Nothing, Act Ill, scene V.
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